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PREFACE
The National Academy of Public Administration is pleased to
submit this report on its assessment of the broad allocation of
technical work performance between the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) staff and its support contractors, and
to a degree within NASA itself. The allocation of technical work
is characterized as "Program Balance."
As NASA proceeds with the many and varied research and
development projects in its inventory, it must contemplate the
status of its internal technical capability to execute those
projects and to confront the national desire to do even more as
embodied by the President's Space Exploration Initiatives.
To provide guidance to its research staff, the Academy
appointed a panel of six experts in the management of scientific
organizations and in the civil space program. The panel drew
significant conclusions from the results of that research and
developed recommendations for the Administrator of NASA based on
that work.
The panel and the research staff greatly appreciate the full
access to senior NASA and contractor managers. Their willingness
to openly express their views has been of great benefit to the
study.
With over 12,500 scientists and engineers on its payroll, NASA
represents a significant national technical capability in
aeronautics and space. This report seeks to assist NASA in
building upon that established capability.
P_esident
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In March of 1990, the NASA Administrator asked the Academy to
perform a study to address these questions: Has NASA contracted
out too much of its technical work to remain a "smart buyer" of
technical products and services from industry? Has NASA's in-house
technical capability eroded over time? Is in-house hands-on
engineering and scientific work truly important to the development
of fully competent scientists and engineers and, if so, does NASA
have enough hands-on work opportunities available? Have the number
and diversity of NASA's programs and projects caused the in-house
science and engineering capability to be "stretched too thin?" Is
NASA still able to attract high quality scientists and engineers,
both at entry and higher levels?
This study is not a staffing requirements review, a personnel
management review, an organizational structure review, or a review
of what the space program of the nation should be. The questions
relate primarily to the allocation of technical work and
responsibility between NASA and its support contractors, within the
agency itself, and the effects of that allocation on NASA's in-
house technical capability to effectively accomplish its assigned
activities. We have labelled that allocation as "program balance."
The task was approached by seeking the insight of those best
in a position to have informed views on the questions posed.
First, since the in-house technical capability of NASA rests in its
field centers, we focused our direct interview research on current
and former senior NASA managers in those centers and on senior
contractor managers supporting those centers. Second, a survey
questionnaire was issued to over 2,200 NASA scientists and
engineers at Grades 12 and 15 - selected because from the Grade 12s
will come the middle management of tomorrow, and from the Grade 15s
will come the senior center management of tomorrow. A total of
1,567 of those surveyed responded, and approximately half of the
respondents volunteered written commentary. That response
vii
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represented 42 percent of NASA's total number of engineers and
scientists at Grades 12 and 15. Finally, NASA's data base on
functional utilization of scientists and engineers, and its annual
manpower summary of civil service and support contractor scientists
and engineers covering fiscal years 1972 through 1990 were
reviewed.
In terms of contracting technical work NASA has, at various
centers, engaged support contractors to do more and more work in
areas previously performed by civil service personnel - developing
technical requirements and specifications, project management,
program control (monitoring contractor progress against overall
contract requirements), supporting source evaluation boards (a
procurement-related activity), monitoring the technical performance
of prime contractors, and performing systems engineering and
integration (involving the work of multiple contractors). While
the use of contractors in support of such activities may be
appropriate, the panel concludes that the trend toward greater
contractor utilization in these areas poses important questions
relating to government and contractor accountability for program
results and indicates a need for greater policy clarification by
agency management.
The balance of expertise in certain technical disciplines has
shifted to support contractors. Those identified by NASA managers
include avionics, stress, thermal, gyros, structural analysis,
software development, computational fluid dynamics,
aerothermodynamics, and systems engineering.
NASA's in-house scientist and engineer population has remained
within a range of 11,500 to 13,000 over the last eighteen years.
Its support contractor scientist and engineer population remained
in a band of 5,000 to 6,500 from fiscal year 1972 through fiscal
year 1987 and dramatically increased in the last three years to a
current total of approximately 13,000. Of the Grade 12 and 15
survey respondents, 58.5 percent believed that the future roles of
contractors should be more limited than presently and 65.7 percent
said the public interest would be best served if less technical
work were contracted out.
With evidence of technical functional and technical discipline
strength movement to support contractors and the dramatic shift in
the ratio of NASA to support contractor engineers and scientists,
the panel concludes that NASA may be losing its ability to operate
as a smart buyer of technical products and services, and to control
and oversee that work in all technical respects.
The agency's program and project work has grown and is more
diverse. This growth in number and diversity is largely due to the
cargo-carrying capability of the Space Shuttle and the resulting
growth in defense, science and applications payloads and
experiments. The field centers have gradually expanded their
program activities over the years into what, for them, were new and
different technical fields. Seventy-six percent of the grade 12
and 15 survey respondents observed that the variety and complexity
of work has increased at their center. The panel concludes that
NASA is stretched too thin in terms of technical management of and
technical support to its wide variety of complex science and
engineering activity.
Between 1980 and 1990, at all but one center, there has been
a gradual decline in the number of civil service scientists and
engineers assigned to the core functions of research, design, test,
and evaluation as a percent of total scientists and engineers. The
center-by-center decline ranged from three percent to fourteen
percent. During the same time period, the total scientist and
engineer population has increased at all centers. The NASA
personnel information system reveals that the growth has taken
place in the field of project development, which is NASA's most
highly contracted technical activity. Special analyses provided
for this study by some centers indicate that the shifts from core
science and engineering activities have been into project
management, flight program and research facility operations, and
the fields of reliability, quality, and safety. The development
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centers have most heavily felt the impact on their core science and
engineering capabilities by the movement of scientists and
engineers into operations support of pre-launch processing and post
launch activities required by long-term flight programs and
projects, such as the Space Shuttle and its many payloads. The
panel concludes that growth of the flight program operations role
has caused NASA to shift a sufficient number of its scientists and
engineers into performance of that role as to be detrimental to the
core science and engineering capabilities of the development
centers.
There is almost unanimous agreement that hands-on science and
engineering work experience is essential to developing scientists
and engineers with a level of knowledge that provides a sixth sense
for spotting problems early, for being a smart buyer of technical
products and services, and for being astute overseers of the work
of technical contractors. Hands-on experience is essential not only
for new engineers and scientists, but to keep current the skills of
those more senior. While several NASA centers have programs
underway to provide more hands-on opportunities, most believe that
they are not doing enough. Over 90 percent of the survey
respondents agreed that hands on work is necessary to acquire and
maintain proficiency, and more than 80 percent said that NASA needs
to do more to provide such opportunity. The panel concludes that
the value of and need for hands-on science and engineering work is
essential to the professional development of NASA scientists and
engineers to effectively perform the work of the agency, and that
the agency needs to provide more of it.
A number of agency management process requirements tend to
dilute the amount of time NASA's scientists and engineers have
available to do technical' work in their specialties. Among those
is the management of Cost Plus Award Fee contracts which cover 62
percent of the agency's contract dollars. This contract type is
preferred by NASA managers because of its rigorous process
orientation and the required detailed and often daily interaction
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between NASA technical employees and contractor employees. The
contract type is accepted by the contractor community, but with the
observation that there is too much involvement by NASA in detailed
administrative matters, and less involvement by NASA technical
specialists in technical performance issues. This type of contract
heavily consumes technical staff time on both sides in the
regularized and repetitive fee determination process. The general
outcome is fees in the range of 7 to 8 percent and no adjective
ratings below "Excellent." The panel concludes that there is
little differentiation in contractor evaluations and that the
amount of technical time consumed in the award fee evaluation
process is not justified by such narrow results.
Other internal management practices impacting NASA scientists
and engineers include highly formal reviews of technical program
status, complex technical organization structures, limited
delegation of authority for resource and technical decision making,
extensive cross coordination and "sign-off" requirements on the way
to technical and resource decision making, and an atmosphere of
risk avoidance. The panel concludes that the agency should be able
to increase the technical utilization of its scientists and
engineers by improving its technical program management processes.
NASA has no difficulty in attracting high quality entry level
scientists and engineers, with an aggregate grade point average of
3.2. The agency has experienced some difficulty in attracting
engineers and scientists with more professional experience,
principally due to non-competitive salaries. The panel believes
that the recently enacted pay reform legislation, particularly as
it relates to geographic pay adjustments and the possibility of
hiring at above the first step of the pay grade, should in the near
term help to resolve NASA's recruiting difficulties at mid-level.
Retention of scientists and engineers in the agency is not a
problem. Over 64 percent of the survey respondents consider NASA
to be their lifetime career. The loss rate, discounting
retirements, is in the range of 2 - 3 percent. The panel concludes
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that, in the area of recruiting and retention of scientists and
engineers, NASA has a good track record and a good system in place,
but should vigorously pursue all management flexibilities available
through the pay reform legislation.
On the general question of whether NASA's in-house technical
capability has eroded over time, NASA and contractor managers
believe that it has, by a ratio of four to one. At the grades 12
and 15 level, only 22.5 percent of all respondents agreed that
NASA's scientific and engineering capabilities are as strong as in
the past. On the basis of functional and discipline movement to
contractors, growth in diversity of project work, the need for more
hands-on work opportunities to improve technical skills, internal
practices limiting technical time available for work in specialty
areas and the direct responses on the issue of NASA's in-house
science and engineering capabilities, the panel concludes that
NASA's in-house technical capability is eroding and is in need of
rebuilding.
The critical technical strength of NASA has long resided in
the civil service scientists and engineers at the centers.
Pressures to reduce government employment, to support a more
diverse array of technical activities, and to convert functions to
contractor performance have resulted in important changes
throughout NASA. Most important has been the gradual erosion of
NASA civil service technical capability at the centers.
The panel recognizes that there are various ways and
combinations in which government research and development
activities can be carried out. It is the panel's strong preference
given the history, culture, and past performance of NASA, that the
agency take actions to rebuild its civil service in-house technical
capability. If circumstances dictate a civil-service/support
contractor technical performance mixture it is imperative, in the
panel's judgment, that such a mixture be in accordance with a plan
and NASA guidance to the centers on which technical functions are
important to be performed consistently by civil service scientists
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and engineers. The panel believes that the guidelines contained in
the 1962 "Report to the President on Government Contracting for
Research and Development," by David Bell and others, still provides
a sound basis for such a plan.
The panel recommends that the Administrator of NASA:
i. Prepare and issue guidance on technical functional areas
to be reserved for in-house civil service performance.
2. Convert contracted technical functions essential to in-
house capability from support contractors to in-house
performance and rebuild strength in specific technical
disciplines critical to agency programs and objectives.
Ceiling relief should be sought if required.
3. Provide policy guidance to the centers to retain in-house
sufficient project, experiment, advance development, and
research activities to provide more hands-on technical
work by civil service scientists and engineers.
4. Examine the project mix at each center against agency and
center goals and objectives. Select those with marginal
contributions and/or staffing for cancellation or
transfer. Assess all projects for suitability of
specific center assignment.
5. Institute an annual critical position review for all
technical disciplines, identify the number and
professional levels of in-house coverage that are
essential to maintaining a reasonable degree of technical
expertise in each critical discipline, and adjust
recruiting and/or contracting plans accordingly.
6. Modify the agency's contractor accountability processes
by tightening controls on attendance participation in
formal reviews, simplifying the award fee determination
process, increasing the use of unannounced contractor
site visits, and rotating NASA personnel stationed in
contractor plants.
Xll!
• Seek opportunities for greater delegation of
resources/technical decision making authority, reducing
multi-party sign-off requirements with encouragement of
reasonable risk taking, and improving lines of authority,
responsibility, and accountability in the technical
management organization.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 1990, Admiral Richard Truly, Administrator of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, asked the National
Academy of Public Administration to undertake a study centered on
several questions involving the state of NASA's in-house technical
capability. The questions were:
i. Has NASA contracted out too much of its technical
work to remain a "smart buyer" of technical
services from industry?
2. Has NASA's in-house technical capability eroded
over time?
3. Is in-house hands-on work really important to the
development and maintenance of fully competent
scientists and engineers? If so, does NASA have
enough hands-on opportunities available?
4. Is NASA still able to attract high quality
scientists and engineers to work for the agency at
entry level and at the experienced level?
5. Is NASA in-house technical capability stretched too
thin by its number and diversity of programs and
projects?
These are important questions to be addressed by any research
and development agency. They reflect a genuine concern by NASA
senior management to assure that their stewardship of the public
investment in the nation's civil space and aeronautics program is
effective in meeting the public's expectations for continued high
performance in that national program.
This study was not approached as a staffing requirements
review, as a personnel management review, as an organizational
review, nor as a review of what the space program of the future
should be. Its focus is limited to the basic question of the
distribution of engineering and scientific work and the effect of
that distribution on NASA's in-house technical capability, as seen
through the eyes of those managing NASA's work at the centers,
those supervising segments of the work at the branch and division
levels in the centers, those civil servants actually performing the
work early in their careers, and contractors supporting the work in
the field.
Data collection was based on interviews with approximately I00
senior NASA and contractor managers mainly at the field center
level, a detailed survey instrument administered to a stratified
sample of over 2,200 and completed by 1,567 NASA scientists and
engineers at Grades 12 and 15, and a review of NASA in-house data
on scientists and engineers, their recruiting, retention, and
utilization. In addition, centers were asked to submit special
analyses on their scientist and engineer populations, tracing
movement from core research and engineering functional activity
into project management, operations, and other major fields
significant to their center. Through these collection techniques
the research staff gained the perspectives of a cross section of
the present senior center managers, the well experienced center
management of the future (GM-15s) and those on the firing line who
generally represent five years or less in experience at NASA but
who are the middle management of the future (GS-12s). The
contractor manager interviews were intended to provide a
counterpoint to the views of the civil servants.
NASA was established in 1959 with the National Advisory
Council on Aeronautics (NACA) as the nucleus. Soon thereafter
elements were transferred to NASA from the Army and the Navy. The
initial result was five of the present NASA Centers - Marshall
Space Flight Center and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory from the
Army, and three from NACA - Langley Research Center, Lewis Research
Center, and Ames Research Center. Four of the present centers have
been established since then - Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson
Space Center, Kennedy Space Center and Stennis Space Center. Each
field center presents a distinct image, culture, and operating
style. To assume that there is a consistent and universally
applicable NASA story on in-house technical capability or use of
support contractors based on commonality of purpose would be a
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mistake. The differing nature of the centers and the diversity of
the work that they perform makes that assumption unrealistic.
An understanding of the organizational environment in NASA led
the research staff to conclude that on-site visits and interviews
with top NASA and contractor managers at the various centers would
be necessary to gain center by center insight into the question of
program balance and in-house technical capability. All centers but
Stennis were visited.
The sections that follow outline the results of staff research
at all the NASA centers, commentary on the meaning of that research
in the NASA context, and panel conclusions and recommendations.
Appendix A presents the full results of the survey of NASA
engineers and scientists at grades 12 and 15.
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SECTION 1
PROGRAM BALANCE - NASA AND SUPPORT CONTRACTORS
In-House Functions
A principal issue in addressing the program balance between
NASA and the support contractor community is an assessment of what
functions are believed to be essential for performance by
government employees in-house to foster and maintain NASA
capability and to assure the proper management and oversight of the
publicly funded research and development programs entrusted to the
agency. In 1962, David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget
led a study group that issued its "Report to the President on
Government Contracting for Research and Development." Other members
of the study group included John W. Macy, Chairman, Civil Service
Commission; Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense; Dr. Glenn T.
Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Allen T. Waterman,
Director, National Science Foundation; James E. Webb,
Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and
Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology. Their report stated the following conclusion:
The basic purposes to be served by Federal research and
development programs are public purposes, considered by
the President and the Congress to be of sufficient
national importance to warrant the expenditure of public
funds. The management and control of such programs must
be firmly in the hands of full-time government officials
clearly responsible to the President and the Congress.
With programs of the size and complexity now common, this
requires that the government have on its staff
exceptionally strong and able executives, scientists, and
engineers, fully qualified to weigh the views and advice
of technical specialists to make policy decisions
concerning the types of work to be undertaken, when, by
whom, and at what cost, to supervise the execution of
work undertaken, and to evaluate the results.
In subsequent testimony before the Congress in hearings on the
group's report, Mr. Bell summarized their view that it was
essential that the government not contract out:
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...the decisions on what work is to be done, what
objectives are to be set for the work, what time period
and what costs are to be associated with the work, what
the results are expected to be, and the evaluation, and
the responsibilities for knowing whether the work has
gone as it was supposed to go, and if it has not, what
went wrong, and why, and how can it be corrected
The panel recognizes that the Bell guidelines are twenty-eight
years old, and that the issue of what functions are essential to be
performed by the government is a current topic in 1990. The panel
believes that the guidelines stated by the Bell study group still
capture the essence of agency responsibility and accountability for
the execution of public research and development programs using
public funds.
In exploring this topic with the senior NASA and contractor
managers interviewed, the research staff found that there is not a
consistent use within or among NASA centers of the term "in-house
capability." In response to the question, "How do you define in-
house?," there was a wide range of answers including civil service
only, civil service and support contractors who work on site, and
civil service plus all support contractors, whether on site or not.
Some specific comments were, "The in-house work force includes both
civil servants and support service contractors. The two are used
almost interchangeably," and "I define 'in-house' in NASA as civil
service only. In NASA, the civil service technical workforce tends
to stay put, and it is NASA's technical memory." These differing
interpretations illustrate that within NASA, discussions of "in-
house capability" may result in misunderstandings between the
parties, leading to decisions with unanticipated consequences.
For purposes of this study, the researchers defined the term
"in-house capability" to mean NASA civil service employees only.
AS expected, there was general acceptance that budgeting, civil
service hiring decisions, quality inspection services and other
basic federal functions are considered to be among those that must
be performed by NASA government employees. Senior managers
acknowledged that NASA must continue to plan, budget, and manage
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the funds, to handle the procurement process, and to retain
sufficient hands-on opportunities for new engineers to develop
their capabilities to properly oversee large technical contract
efforts. They also believed that contractors should not perform
NASA program control functions nor assist in Source Evaluation
Board work. Another view was that malfunction analysis capability
(what went wrong) is an essential in-house role.
Although some managers believe that there is no technical work
that must absolutely be done in-house, several NASA and contractor
managers identified specific items that they believe should always
be maintained in-house:
o Systems Engineering
o Development of requirements and specifications
o Project management and program control
o Cross cutting technologies such as materials
o Cost estimating
o Procurement
o Facilities design requirements
o A research base for each essential technical specialty in
NASA
Contractors and NASA managers added that NASA should not
contract out project integration, and that it should pay particular
attention to areas of high technical risk. One contractor manager
gave what amounts to a concise summary of views expressed by
several contractors, "NASA should maintain control of its programs.
That would include cost and schedule control, contract control, the
establishment of technical performance requirements, and monitoring
of those. Also, NASA must keep enough hands-on work in-house to
train new technical employees."
The panel believes that while all the functions mentioned are
important, the concept of always performing them in-house is not a
black and white issue. There are control and support roles
associated with each. The key issue is whether NASA has sufficient
numbers of strong and capable scientists and engineers to make the
best decisions and oversee the resulting work on the public's
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behalf. Other than for major procurement actions which obligate
government funds, there is some room for argument on the degree of
in-house execution and control NASA must have over the items
listed.
One area that seems especially relevant to the question of
balance is the determination of technical requirements and
specifications. One could argue that if NASA does not have the
ability clearly to state what its technical requirement is, and the
performance expectations and limits within which the end product
should operate, then NASA is not ready to procure anything and
needs to do some more homework. The panel believes that there are
exceptions here as well. If NASA is seeking to solicit the private
sector for an item or system that is a variation of something
widely used and normally available from the vendor community, then
it might be acceptable to communicate to a support contractor the
broad outlines of the need and the performance expectations and for
NASA to task the support contractor to develop the requirements
document and specifications. Again the issue is control by the
government, and the presence in the government of the strong and
able scientists and engineers who can judge and be certain that the
requirements and specifications documents produced indeed meet all
the technical aspects of their desires, and that the specifications
indeed reflect the performance expectations for the item. In such
a case, the panel believes that use of support contractors would be
suitable.
Similar analyses can be made of some of the other areas listed
such as systems engineering and cross-cutting technologies, always
coming back to the need for NASA to be in scientific and
engineering control throughout. Concerning project management,
program control, cost estimating, maintaining a technology base,
and expertise in key disciplines the panel leans more toward in-
house capability and performance, though there may still be room
for limited contractor support.
Nonetheless, there is a belief among the senior managers
interviewed that the functions listed should be governmental in
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determination of objectives, performance, and control. There is
considerable sentiment that NASA should retain the basic systems
engineering and systems integration roles using contractors in
support roles only. There is agreement that NASA should retain
research and engineering capability in all key technical
disciplines that it considers critical to exercising its
responsibilities.
The next logical inquiry is NASA's present use of support
contractors, the relationships established, and whether NASA is
presently contracting for any of those functions that are generally
perceived as belonging in-house.
Use of Support Contractors
Contracting consumed 88 percent of the NASA budget in fiscal
year 1989, a large absolute number of dollars - in excess of ten
billion. This percentage is consistent with NASA's history of
contracting.
To keep matters in perspective, it must be remembered that
there has always been close interaction between NASA and contractor
personnel. Civil servants work closely with contractors at all
levels and in many capacities. NASA and contractors generally
operate in a team mode and support contractors are often considered
part of the "in-house" team. However, some aspects of the
relationship between NASA and contractors are troublesome.
Interviewees noted some erosion of government control over the
technical decision processes, and greater distance of civil
servants from direct personal involvement in issue identification
and resolution. There appeared to be a consensus that senior
managers fill voids with support service contractors. Support
service contractors are almost totally integrated into the work
force in several centers, and in most centers there is a clearly
stated openness or willingness to share information and work
between the civil servants and the contractors. As one senior NASA
manager put it, "Engineering problems respond to the laws of
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physics, and the laws of physics are not bound by the color of a
badge."
Centers were careful to point out that although support
contractors sometimes perform contract management tasks involving
other contractors, they are not allowed to issue change orders
unilaterally. Formal contract management and the application of
time tested management controls come from the civil servants.
Although NASA managers expressed many positive opinions
concerning the effective conduct of work by support contractors,
they also discussed problems. For example, many NASA managers
believe that the use of support contractors involves considerable
inefficiencies, that the mixed work force has demoralizing effects
on the civil service staff, that consensus decision making is of
great concern, and that systems of checks and balances are not
operating independently.
NASA officials pointed out to the research staff that there
are, of course, legal constraints and rules for what can and cannot
be done by contractors. For example, only a civil servant can
instruct a contractor to do a task that will affect the cost of a
contract or in any way affect the contractor's fee. Contractors
cannot be involved in personnel matters or serve on Source
Evaluation Board (SEB) teams. Nevertheless, objectivity and proper
distance are not always maintained. Under some circumstances,
contractors are believed to be performing functions that should be
performed by NASA. Project program control functions (planning,
scheduling, configuration control, etc.), for example, are being
done by support contractors at several centers. Contractors are
increasingly monitoring other contractors. Several centers are
using support contractors to develop requirements and
specifications. There was some use of support contractors in
support of Source Evaluation Boards.
Some senior contractor officials observed that for many
contracts it is difficult to tell contractor personnel from civil
servants. Other contractors believed that absorption of
contractors into the civil service/contractor team concept has been
i0
a positive step because it has cut through hierarchical lines and
resulted in direct contract liaison and integration.
Several contractors mentioned that NASA initially played a
very strong role in determining what was done and how it was done.
Performance of activities by parties was clear cut. Long range
planning was done, for the most part, by civil servants.
Originally, NASA operated its laboratories with civil service
technicians and engineers. Over the years many laboratory functions
were shifted to exclusive performance by contractors. Then, with
the continuing pressure to reduce the overall number of NASA
employees, almost all of the technicians disappeared.
Contractor and NASA managers noted that NASA now depends more
on contractors for short and long range planning, trade off
studies, laboratory operations and technician support and that NASA
could not operate currently without that support.
Senior contractor officials observed that industry is often
faced with mixed motives. If they are too cooperative, they can
get into difficulties because government contracting officers may
look upon their behavior as competitively disadvantageous. Another
difficulty is that the government often asks for much more work
than the amount covered by the contract funding. When NASA does
preliminary designs for projects in-house industry believes it must
closely follow NASA designs or run the risk of offending someone.
Similarly, if NASA does a cost estimate in-house, industry
reportedly tends to agree with the figure rather than risk the loss
of a potential contract.
Several contractors suggested that there should be a clearer
separation of responsibility and accountability between NASA and
the contractor. NASA should select tasks that they do entirely
themselves or turn the entire task over to the contractor. Many
contractors object to NASA doing parts of tasks, and then turning
them over to contractors.
Finally, some contractors believe that the present use of
Award Fee Contracting has established an adversary environment
between NASA and industry. They believe that government people take
Ii
a very guarded approach when dealing with their counterparts in
industry.., too guarded.
Returning to the topic of whether any of the areas identified
as belonging in-house have moved to contractors, NASA managers
cited several technical areas in which the NASA in-house capability
had diminished substantially and moved to the contractor workforce.
At one center, a senior engineering manager stated that almost
all avionics engineers are contractors, almost all structural
analysis people are contractors, and only one civil servant is a
gyro expert. At another center, a senior engineering manager
stated that the in-house civil service facility design capability
has completely eroded.
Another senior center official pointed out that many of the
latest technological advances in aerodynamics involve computational
fluid dynamics. He noted that the automation expertise required to
implement computational fluid dynamics generally rests in the
university community or with certain contractors.
Several interviewees and survey respondents that provided
narrative comments to the written questionnaire were concerned
about NASA's capability in software development. They did not
believe that NASA's technical abilities in these key areas of
sophistication paralleled the growing abilities in industry and
believe that improved skills in these areas need to be assimilated
into the NASA organization.
A NASA engineering manager at a development center said that
the lack of technical help forced the project directorate to hire
and use support contractors in roles previously filled only by in-
house civil servants. For example, project level management
positions just below project manager positions are now filled at
that center by support contractor personnel. He believes that this
situation does not guarantee that the government benefits from the
long-term dedication and technical competence of civil service
engineers in key decision-making jobs. It also leads to the loss of
the "smart buyer" capability. He speculated that project
discipline engineers (optics, thermal, etc.) will eventually lose
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their problem solving capability by becoming totally dependent on
support contractor personnel through task orders. On that same
point, interviewees suggested that there has been a decline in the
agency's technical capability that was accelerated by the writing
of broad, overarching contracts. "It has become easy to add tasks
traditionally handled by the civil service work force," a NASA
manager stated. Narrative comments on the survey questionnaire
revealed that the personal experience of many scientists and
engineers coincided with the interviewees' observations about the
ease in adding tasks to existing contracts.
The Ames Research Center provided specific data for fiscal
years 1971 and 1988 on what they term as "areas of research
excellence." The areas covered such disciplines as
aerothermodynamics, spacecraft systems, gravitational biology,
computational chemistry, and intelligent systems. In fiscal year
1971, Ames had 162 civil service scientists and engineers in those
disciplines supported by 67 support contractors. In fiscal year
1988, Ames had 131 civil service scientists and engineers - a
decline of 19 percent - supported by 156 support contractor
scientists and engineers - a gain of 133 percent.
At another research center a senior manager noted that, "The
center has hired about 800 researchers on support contracts in
recent years. I believe they have gone too far in this direction.
I am concerned that continuation of the process of hiring the more
experienced researchers on contracts will eventually result in the
support contractor personnel supervising the less experienced civil
servants. The number of support contractors as principal authors
on research papers is increasing. About 25 percent of the contract
researchers are now principal authors." He went on to add that
many discipline engineers at the center are now project managers
and much of the discipline engineering is being done by
contractors.
Erosion of in-house capability in systems engineering was
repeatedly pointed out by interviewees. A senior NASA manager
observed, "Technical capability in systems engineering has eroded.
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Numbers have eroded in other skills, limiting the amount of
contractor penetration that can be performed." Although systems
engineering is widely perceived as a key factor in the success of
NASA, a contractor interviewee observed that NASA thinks of systems
engineering simply as the management of interfaces while it should
consider treating spacecraft as integrated pieces of hardware.
Systems engineering should incorporate trade-offs that must be done
in an integrated design and provide for testing, integration,
planning and execution.
At another center, an interviewee expressed the belief that
the contractors have greater expertise in most flight mechanical
systems - except engines. He also expressed discomfort with the
level of NASA in-house systems engineering capability in relation
to propulsion and power, mechanical, and guidance and control.
Supplemental examinations of the use of contractors were
provided by answers to several questionnaire items. Nine hundred
and ten, or 58.5 percent of the Grade 12 and 15 scientist and
engineer respondents, said that they agreed that the future roles
of contractors should be more limited than presently. Fourteen
percent disagreed and the rest were neutral. On a center basis,
the three centers who most strongly believed that contractors'
roles should be limited were the Kennedy Space Center, the Marshall
Space Flight Center and the Goddard Space Flight Center with
respective percentages of 68.7 percent, 63.0 percent, and 61.9
percent. More than half (56.6 percent) of NASA scientist and
engineer respondents agreed that contractors have assumed many
roles that are governmental, while 16.5 percent disagreed.
Examples of governmental roles were the committing of government
resources (22.7 percent), defining work assignments (37.9 percent)
and representing NASA at meetings (58.4 percent). Five hundred and
eighty-two (34 percent) of those who responded to the survey agreed
that many important management decisions are being made by
contractors, not civil servants; 30.6 percent of the respondents
were neutral and 35.5 percent disagreed.
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A strong plurality of survey respondents (65.7 percent) said
the public interest would be best served if less technical work
were contracted to the private sector; 12.6 percent of the
respondents disagreed.
In addition to responses to specific questions respondents at
all sites added written comments on contracting. Comments stressed
that contracting has led to a demise in the in-house capacity to
run programs, to inadequate controls on contracts, and to the loss
of accountability to the public. Several stated that contractors
now do critical work that should be done by civil servants thus
leading to a deterioration of NASA's in-house capability and an
irreversible dependency on contractors. Other respondents pointed
out that, in many cases, contractors perform more interesting tasks
than civil servants.
Several respondents suggested that allocations of work between
civil servants and contractors should be examined on a task by task
basis and that patterns and ratios of personnel working in support
of scientists and engineers, such as skilled craftsmen and shop and
production workers need to be examined.
Many of the written comments reflected the general belief that
NASA has turned over critical tasks to contractors and has lost the
ability to critique contractor designs, tests, and operations. The
bottom line of the many narrative comments relating to roles of
contractors is that it is in the best interest of NASA to have more
control over its work and more input into it.
The final source of data for assessing NASA's use of support
contractor scientists and engineers was the annual workforce
analysis prepared by NASA. It breaks the civil service workforce
and the support contractor workforce into skill areas, including
science and engineering for fiscal years 1972 through 1987. After
fiscal year 1987, the report does not break the support contractor
data into skill areas.
The data show that the civil service scientist and engineer
population in the agency has remained in a band between 11,500 and
13,000 throughout the entire eighteen-year period. The data also
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show that the support contractor scientist and engineer contingent
has remained in a band between 5,000 and 6,500 for fiscal years
1972 through 1987. In fiscal years 1988 through 1990, there was a
dramatic increase in the overall support contractor population - on
the order of i0,000. A senior manager at agency level advised that
6,000 of the i0,000 were scientists and engineers. That led the
research staff to believe that the support contractor S&E
population now approaches parity with the civil service S&E
population - approximately 12,500 apiece. The trend is clearly a
significant increase in the number of science and engineering
support contractors leading to a natural presumption that there is
more science and engineering work moving in that direction from
NASA centers.
The panel concludes that NASA is using support contractors in
varying degrees to assist in or execute technical functional areas
such as project management, program control, support to source
evaluation board activities, technical oversight of other
contractors, systems engineering, and development of requirements
and specifications. While the panel believes that there is room
for judgment in that use, and that contractor capability in those
areas can be of help to NASA, functions such as those outlined are
in need of detailed review by NASA to assure that sufficient
technical expertise for decision making and control is, in fact, in
the hands of the government.
The panel also concludes that there has been considerable
erosion in NASA in-house strength in technical disciplines such as
avionics, stress, thermal, gyros, structural analysis, software
development, computational fluid dynamics, aerothermodynamics, and
systems engineering. The panel suspects there are other such
disciplines that were simply not used by managers as examples in
the course of the interview process.
The panel does not believe that NASA must have knowledge
superior to industry in all of these disciplines, but does believe
that sufficient understanding of each must exist within NASA in
order that it can effectively weigh the technical options and
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approaches, decide the course of action, oversee execution of the
work, evaluate the results, and maintain technical control.
Consequently, the panel considers erosion in key disciplines to
have a detrimental effect on NASA's in-house technical capability.
The panel recommends that the Administrator of NASA:
- Prepare and issue guidance on technical functional
areas to be reserved for in-house civil service
performance.
Convert contracted technical functions essential to
in-house capability from support contractors to in-
house performance and rebuild strength in specific
technical disciplines critical to agency programs
and objectives. Ceiling relief should be sought if
required.
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SECTION 2
PROGRAM BALANCE - INSIDE NASA
To review the allocation of technical work within NASA, the
research staff focused on the program/project mix and work
diversity in the agency, and searched for trends in movement from
core science and engineering work to areas such as project
management and operations of various types. The research staff
also reviewed the results of diversification strategies employed by
some centers, and the value of hands-on experience to science and
engineering work.
In reviewing the agency's formal staffing and utilization
data, the research staff focused on the functional utilization of
NASA's engineers and scientists. Finally, the staff examined the
impact of NASA's long-term flight program operations role on the
utilization of agency engineers and scientists.
Program Project Mix
At the outset of the study, NASA management raised the issue
of whether NASA has more projects underway than can be adequately
handled, and whether the diversity of those projects was having a
negative effect on the agency's ability to manage them.
NASA and contractor senior managers were almost unanimous in
their belief that the number and diversity of program and project
activities in the agency has increased. They also commented on the
increased complexity of some projects, and on the increased time
required to accomplish project tasks. One NASA manager illustrated
the point, "There are more program activities in NASA now than
during Apollo, and the complexity is much greater. For instance,
there are now many more channels of data requiring reduction and
analysis. This means that the complexity is not just in design,
launch, and orbital operations but in ground crew time and talent
required to handle the data." Others noted that NASA now has much
more complex defense and science payloads, resulting in more
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complex payload management and processing activities for each
Shuttle flight.
Centers' workloads have also become more diverse. Lewis
Research Center, one of the three NACA research centers forming the
nucleus of NASA, moved first into launch vehicle development, then
energy related activities, applications work and satellites, and
now is responsible for development of the Space Station Power
System while continuing traditional aeronautical research work.
The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) was originally a
propulsion and launch vehicle center. Now their programs range
from science payloads involving optics to x-ray to plasmas coupled
with responsibility for the Shuttle main engines, external tank,
and solid rocket boosters; major involvement in the Space Station
Freedom; and principal responsibility for Spacelab. By some
estimates, there are now 50-70 active, diversified project
activities at MSFC, not including many experiments managed by and
sometimes built at the center. Other centers have similar stories.
Several interviewees stated that programs now take longer to
accomplish. Some of the causes for the extended time are the
decrease in the number of wage grade technicians and craftspersons
available to assist engineers and scientists, increases in the
period to complete procurements, inexperience of younger personnel,
increases in documentation requirements, increases in replanning
exercises for re-scoped projects, burdensome procedures, and matrix
management schemes.
Senior contractor managers also tended to agree that the
project mix at the centers they serve has increased, together with
the complexity and the length of time to complete. One measured
the increase by growth in staffing of his own contract saying, "The
number of projects has increased as evidenced by our personnel
going from about 200 to 2200 over the years." Another commented
about the situation at the Kennedy Space Center, "NASA suffers from
program diversity; there are so many projects going on at KSC that
you cannot list them on two sheets of paper." And finally, another
contractor observed, "We believe that there are many fragmented
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programs in NASA now. Each small project takes as much effort to
manage as a large one." Contractors were in agreement that
projects take longer to complete because of procurement lag time
and internal NASA decision making processes.
To solicit the views of grade 12 and 15 scientists and
engineers about the diversity of programs, the survey asked, "Since
joining NASA, has the diversity (e.g., variety and complexity of
work) increased at your center?", 1,537 respondents answered. Of
those, 1,168 (76 percent) answered "Yes." The highest percentage
of major center respondents who answered yes were 81 percent from
Marshall, 80 percent from Johnson, 78.3 percent from Langley, 78.1
percent from Lewis, 73.5 percent from Ames, and 64.7 percent from
Kennedy. Although the consequences of growing program complexity
were not explicitly requested, many narrative comments observed
that as projects have become more comprehensive and larger, they
call for more interdisciplinary talents; more formal reporting
systems are required; and financial and administrative processes
proliferate.
Many times, narrative comments on the diversity of programs
turned into cases against large projects. Some respondents
believed that large projects are generally poorly conceived,
unfocused, inadequately funded and never seem to get completed.
They said the breadth and depth of large projects lead to
unrealistic expectations, greater inefficiencies, and the
dedication of large parts of the project budget to administrative
matters. Some noted that the excess of planning and tracking data
for large projects has resulted in information overload. Woven
through these observations was the need to set priorities for work
and strive for balanced allocations between big and small projects.
The panel concludes that the number, diversity, complexity,
and length of time to complete program activities in NASA have
increased. The various workload preservation strategies adopted by
some centers, principally after the completion of Apollo, resulted
in major diversification in technical program activities carried
out by the centers. The effect of the Shuttle, and its ability to
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place a number of payloads - large and small - into space on a
single flight, has greatly increased the amount of project activity
at certain centers, especially in managing and processing science
and applications payloads and experiments.
The panel recommends that the Administrator of NASa:
Examine the project mix at each center against
agency and center goals and objectives. Select
those with marginal contributions and/or staffing
for cancellation or transfer. Assess all projects
for suitability of specific center assignment.
Hands-On Experience
During management interviews the notion that experience gained
by direct and personal execution of design, analysis, prototyping,
test, and evaluation is essential to the full development of
engineering skills and a "sixth sense" for recognizing potential
design flaws affecting production or operations was explicitly
stated. Only two of the interview subjects suggested that young
engineers could gain necessary experience by reviewing the work of
others and by observing outcomes.
Generally, views of the managers interviewed were intensely
stated. An illustrative view was, "There is a direct relationship
between hands-on experience and contractor oversight capability.
One has to know from experience how to get a drawing out, how to
process a part, how to manage a budget, etc." And from another, "If
one does not work on a project from cradle to grave one loses the
ability to track the manufacturing of products. This, in turn,
affects the reliability of products. Engineers may go to the floor
and not perceive problems." The sum and substance of all the
responses on this subject is that hands-on experience and exposure
is absolutely necessary. It is important for newly hired engineers
to be able to convert theory into practice by being involved in a
project involving the entire design/prototyping/test/checkout
process.
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Concerning views of the newer NASA scientists and engineers,
one manager reported that "Both co-op students and recent hires
define hands-on capability as problem solving. They believe they
have to perform technical tasks to solve certain problems. They
note that NASA is contracting out too many problem solving
activities. Many recent hires believe that they are managing work
performed by contractors rather than performing it themselves.
Challenging tasks, they observed, are often handed off."
NASA contractors echoed NASA managers' views about the value
of hands-on experience and there was broad agreement among the
contractors that NASA should always keep enough hands-on work in-
house to keep their technical people sharp. One contractor observed
that when the NASA engineers dealing with his contract are weak, it
makes his job much more difficult. He would far prefer to see
strong technical capability in NASA.
Specific programs have been instituted at some of the centers
to deal with this issue, but managers believe that there is still
not enough hands-on opportunity to meet the developmental needs of
all young engineers. Notable are the efforts at the Marshall,
Kennedy, and Goddard centers.
At the Marshall Space Flight Center, young engineers are
trained on several in-house projects including the Technology Test
Bed for liquid engine R&D; use of solid rocket test facilities at
the center; design & development of the Aeroballistic Flight
Experiment; several Spacelab experiments where the hardware is
built at the center; design and development of the Space Station
environmental control system; and many supporting research and
technology projects.
At the Kennedy Space Center a program assigns new engineering
hires to the Level IV payload integration program for a time. In
that program, the engineers have to understand the flight
experiments, design, develop, build, and test the apparatus
required to install the experiment in the Shuttle and support its
operation. Engineers assigned to Level IV do not want to leave.
They become so engaged in this aspect of preparing hardware for
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flight, that they do not wish to move to positions where they are
monitoring the engineering work of others. Because of this, all
new engineers have not been able to participate in this program.
At the Goddard Space Flight Center, a former center director
began keeping one or more projects in-house to provide hands-on
training to young engineers. This policy, which began in the late
1970s, is still in effect and is considered by some center
officials to be strongly contributing to the recovery of in-house
technical capability at Goddard. The $200 million Cosmic
Background Explorer (COBE) project was done in-house and the Small
Explorer Program (SMEX) is being done in-house at this time.
In response to a survey item as to whether NASA scientists and
engineers should perform hands-on work once in a while to maintain
their proficiency, over 90 percent of the respondents agreed that
such work should indeed be done. A subsequent question, focusing
on the statement that people with direct problem solving experience
get the best results elicited an agreement rate of 89.7 percent.
Eighty-three percent of the respondents agreed that hands-on
experience is required to understand how to manage and evaluate
contractors' efforts.
A large number of Grade 12 and 15 scientists and engineers
(1,289 or 83.2 percent) agreed that NASA needs to expand or
initiate more in-house project work to provide for hands-on
experience.
The vast majority of scientists and engineers responding to
the narrative part of the questionnaire reinforced the perception
concerning the loss of in-house capability and reemphasized the
need to perform more hands-on tasks. The doing is considered
essential to learning. One engineer noted that engineers are not
as sensitive to hardware as they should be because they are
"absorbed in program status presentations and don't get any hands-
on experience beyond the utilization of copying machines." Another
engineer said, "Once engineers become contract monitors, not doers,
the appeal of their jobs fade, unless opportunities for real
direction are part of the monitoring effort."
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Employees from several centers also noted that contracting
resulted in not only the deterioration of hands-on experience but
also the loss of institutional memory within NASA. Several
employees pointed out that there appears to be an absence of a
foundation upon which to base certain decisions and contended that
an indigenous repository of knowledge helps to establish strong
professional identities. Although individuals may develop
specialized knowledge through reading and research, "know-how" is
generally acquired through considerable hands-on experience.
In the judgment of many respondents it would be beneficial if
researchers and model makers, for example, could work closely
together to enhance their mutual understanding of the work. Such
understanding can only be developed through actual practice.
According to respondents, keeping more project work in-house
will: (i) promote a sense of pride, (2) enhance control, (3)
develop skills, (4) ensure accountability, (5) attract capable
people, (6) contribute to the retention of employees and (7) regain
the creative spirit.
The panel concludes that hands-on work experience is
invaluable to honing technical skills, developing a "sixth sense"
for identification of technical problems, serving as a "smart
buyer" of technical products, becoming a skilled project/program
manager, and more effectively monitoring contracted work.
The panel recommends that the Administrator of NASA:
- Provide policy guidance to the centers to retain
in-house sufficient project, experiment, advance
development, and research activities to provide
more hands-on technical work by civil service
scientists and engineers.
Internal Dynamics Of NASA Technical Workforce
The purpose of examining the internal dynamics of NASA's
engineer and scientist population at the centers was to ascertain
whether there had been movement away from core science and
engineering activities such as research, design, test, and
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evaluation. These are the technical functions that provide hands-
on work to strengthen technical capability. Data on this subject
was sparse, but revealing.
The NASA Personnel Management Information system (PMIS) data
reveals that for the period 1980 through 1990, the number of NASA
scientists and engineers assigned to the PMIS categories of
research, design, test, and evaluation has gradually declined as a
percentage of the total number of NASA scientists and engineers
(down 3 percent overall), while the total number of NASA scientists
and engineers has risen 15 percent over that same period. The
earliest PMIS data available on this topic is for 1980.
Center trends derived from PMIS data vary markedly. The only
gain (4 percent) registered for scientists and engineers assigned
to research, design, test, and evaluation as a percentage of total
S&E population was at Langley Research Center. The greatest
decline (14 percent) was at Lewis Research Center.
As expected, the research centers - as opposed to the
development centers - operate with a much higher percentage of
scientists and engineers assigned to these core functions (38
percent at Lewis to 59 percent at Langley in 1990). In the
development centers, Goddard Space Flight Center has the highest
percentage of total scientists and engineers in those functions (23
percent), the Johnson Space Center has the lowest (8 percent), with
the Marshall Space Flight Center at 12 percent.
Although the research staff realizes that in-house development
is an important part of the core scientific and engineering
function of NASA, the structure of the PMIS data base does not
permit disaggregation of the overall development category. During
the period (1980 - 1990), the number of NASA scientists and
engineers coded to development has risen at all centers, with the
highest rise at Lewis Research Center (141 percent) and the lowest
rise at Langley Research Center (2 percent). Some of theft
increase reflects the efforts of NASA centers to increase the
amount of in-house development work that they can do, but the NAPA
research staff believes that the greatest use of that increase is
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in oversight of development work underway by contractors, and in
engineering support to long-term flight project operations, areas
for which no PMIS categories exist.
To distinguish between utilization in program/project
management, program operations, and core functions, NAPA asked each
center to analyze its civil service and support contractor science
and engineering workforce and provide a breakout covering the
period 1972 to the present, if possible. The Marshall, Johnson and
Kennedy Space Centers, which represent approximately 50 percent of
the civil servant scientist and engineering workforce, responded to
the data request with information that conformed closely to it.
They made it clear that center data is not regularly maintained in
such a way and the responses represented their best efforts at
satisfying the request.
a. Marshall Space Flight Center. The MSFC data is for civil
service scientists and engineers only and shows four categories of
utilization from fiscal years 1971 through 1990. Over that period
the category "experimental design and analysis" (which represents
the MSFC"core" capability) shows a decline from 1,994 to 1644 - a
drop of 18 percent. Project management shows a decline from 385 to
350 over the period, a drop of 9 percent. Operations support shows
an increase from 50 to 125, a growth of 150 percent. MSFC added a
fourth category, Institutional Support, which shows growth from 82
in fiscal year 1971 to 267 in fiscal year 1990 - an increase of 226
percent. Most of that growth occurred from fiscal year 1986
through fiscal year 1990 and represents increasing numbers of
scientists and engineers allocated to reliability and quality
assurance activities. The center's total S&E complement declined
over the period from 2,511 in fiscal year 1971 to 1900 in fiscal
year 1981 - a drop of 24 percent. The center has, in recent
years, built that workforce back to a fiscal year 1990 level of
2,386 - still down 5 percent from the fiscal year 1971 level.
b. Johnson Space Center. JSC provided data for both civil
service and support contractors for fiscal years 1973 through 1990
in three categories: project management, operations, and core:
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i. Project Management. Civil service scientists and
engineers allocated to this function increased from 341 in fiscal
year 1973 to 607 in fiscal year 1990, a growth of 78 percent.
Support contractor scientists and engineers in project management
increased from 377 in fiscal year 1973 to 923 in fiscal year 1990,
a growth of 145 percent.
2. Operations. Civil Service scientists and engineers
allocated to operations increased over the period from 545 to 622,
a growth of 14 percent. Support contractor scientists and
engineers assigned to this function increased from 1,586 in fiscal
year 1973 to 2,420 in fiscal year 1990, a growth of 53 percent.
3. Core. Civil Service scientists and engineers
allocated to core functions decreased from 1,140 in fiscal year
1973 to 1,050 in fiscal year 1990, a drop of 8 percent. Support
contractors assigned to this function increased over the same
period from 1,348 in fiscal year 1973 to 2,595 in fiscal year 1990,
a growth of 93 percent.
The JSC total civil service S&E complement has increased from
2,026 in fiscal year 1973 to 2,279 in fiscal year 1990 - growth of
12 percent. The center's support contractor scientist and engineer
complement, over that same period, has grown from 3,311 in fiscal
year 1973 to 5,938 in fiscal year 1990 - an increase of 79 percent.
c. Kennedy Space Center. KSC provided supplementary data
for fiscal years 1980 through 1990 for both civil service and
support contractor scientists and engineers. KSC divided
operations into three subgroups - flight operations, mission
support operations, and cargo operations, however, they have been
aggregated into a single group for this analysis. KSC also
provided a breakdown of Program/Project Management and Engineering
Design/Analysis.
i. Program/Project Management. KSC civil service
scientists and engineers allocated to this function have decreased
from 113 in fiscal year 1980 to 77 in fiscal year 1990, a drop of
32 percent. KSC shows no support contractor scientists and
engineers allocated to this function.
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2. Operations. KSC civil service scientists and
engineers assigned to operations have increased from 740 in fiscal
year 1980 to 1,018 in fiscal year 1990, a gain of 38 percent. KSC
support contractor scientists and engineers assigned to this
function have increased from 1,116 in fiscal year 1980 to 3,195 in
fiscal year 1990, a growth of 186 percent.
3. Engineering Design/Analysis. Civil Service
scientists and engineers assigned to this function at KSC have
remained stable with 289 in fiscal year 1980 and 292 in fiscal year
1990. Support contractor scientists and engineers assigned to this
function have decreased from 635 in fiscal year 1980 to 109 in
fiscal year 1990, a drop of 83 percent.
The KSC total civil service Science and Engineering complement
has grown from 1,142 in fiscal year 1980 to 1,387 in fiscal year
1990 for a gain of 21 percent. The support contractor scientist
and engineer complement has grown over that same period from 1,751
in fiscal year 1980 to 3,195 in fiscal year 1990, a gain of 82
percent.
The data from Ames Research Center show changes in ratios for
1970 and 1990 in the functional activities of scientists and
engineers as a percentage of total Ames civil service S&E
population. Most telling is the shift from i0 percent to 30
percent of total involved in program/project management and the
accompanying decline of those involved in engineering from 28
percent in 1970 to 15 percent in 1990.
The research staff concludes from NASA's personnel management
information system (PMIS) data that NASA civil service scientists
and engineers engaged in research, design, test and evaluation are
in decline as a percentage of total scientists and engineers in the
agency, while the total agency population of scientists and
engineers is on the increase. From that same data, the research
staff notes that utilization of civil service scientists and
engineers in the category of development, the most heavily
contracted technical function of NASA, has increased at all centers
except KSC and SSC.
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From the supplemental data, the research staff notes that at
MSFC, JSC and KSC there is a marked upward trend in assignment of
civil service scientists and engineers to Operations, while core
engineering functions are declining. At JSC, there is also a
marked increase in assignment of civil service scientists and
engineers to project management functions.
The Operations Support Role
The topic of "Operations" elicited many comments from senior
managers in NASA and in the contractor interviews. There is no
consistent use of the term "operations" within the NASA community.
In the development centers and at the Kennedy Space Center, the
topic is addressed as it relates to pre-launch, launch, and post
launch operational support of flight projects. There is broad
recognition that NASA has a number of programs that will require
long-term commitment of scientists and engineers to pre and post-
launch support such as the Shuttle, Hubble, AXAF, Galileo, and
Magellan, and eventually the space station. These result in large
and continuing requirements for data reduction and analysis.
At the front end of operations support to flight projects,
there is agreement that the multiplicity and technological variety
of large and small payloads place additional demands on technical
staffing for managing and processing those payloads. The recovery,
refurbishment, acquisition of replacement elements, assembly and
stacking of the shuttle itself is seen as a major and continuing
operational activity. Mission Operations is seen as more
sophisticated with astronauts and mission scientists both on board
and doing a variety of complex work with complex equipment, often
in an interactive mode with engineers and scientists on the ground,
sometimes in multiple geographic locations.
At the research centers, the term "Operations" is more often
associated with the operation and use of technical facilities
connected with research activities - wind tunnel operations for
instance. At all centers, engineers involved in facility planning,
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design, and acquisition regard their work as operations in support
of the institution.
Included in this section are observations from NASA and
contractor managers on NASA's use of scientists and engineers in
pre-launch, launch, post launch, and spacecraft operating needs and
for operations support of certain technical research facilities.
One senior NASA manager observed, "Operations is a major issue
at this center...for instance, the present demands are related to
the Shuttle and the Hubble, with Space Station coming on. Then,
there will be Magellan and Galileo. All require long-term
operational support. Operations can consume all."
From another perspective, a NASA manager noted, "The
requirement for personnel and management attention on the very
complex shuttle program makes the payload and space station
business secondary. I worry a little that Space Station will not
get the attention or manpower that it needs. Operations people are
in short supply now for Spacelab. Space Station is, of course, in
a growth mode across the agency."
From the standpoint of research facility operations, a
research center manager observed, "Operational requirements have
grown with the addition of new facilities such as the Numerical
Aerodynamic Simulator (NAS), the Artificial Intelligence
Laboratory, and the Space Manned Vehicle Research Facility. In the
case of NAS, 80 percent of the time on the computer system is
dedicated to users other than those at the center including other
parts of NASA, industry, and the academic community. This
increases the need for manpower."
Finally, the long-term effect of shuttle engineering demands
was summed up thus, "The Shuttle should not be tying up center
people now, but change papers on the Space Shuttle Main Engine and
the Solid Rocket Booster are higher now than at the start of the
program. The chance of any change working the first time is 80
percent."
Some senior contractor managers also had observations and
concerns about the implications of operations on NASA's in-house
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technical capability. During the contractor interviews, there was
a singular interpretation of the term "Operations" as meaning
flight program operations as opposed to research support or
institutional facilities. In general, contractors perceived a
shift of NASAtechnical personnel into operations and, as expected,
several believed more operations should be contracted.
Grades 12 and 15 scientists and engineers were asked to list
their primary and secondary work activities. Operations was the
fourth largest category, with 13.7 percent of all respondents
claiming it as their primary work activity and 11.4 percent
claiming it as their secondary work activity. When viewed by grade
level, operations moves into second place (behind applied research)
for the GS-12's with 18.9 percent claiming it as their primary work
activity. On a center basis, the largest number of total
respondents claiming operations as primary were at Kennedy (35.5
percent) and Johnson (20.1 percent). Langley was lowest with 4.2
percent.
Commentators who provided written responses generally agreed
that operational activities have had great influence on NASA's
ability to perform its mission because they represent a significant
commitment of organizational resources. Several noted that immense
undertakings such as the Shuttle program have resulted in
transitional difficulties and warned that preparations necessary
for operations are expensive financially, administratively and
technically. Some suggested that operations can be more
effectively served by different organizational arrangements and
more stable funding streams.
The panel concludes that there has been and is a trend away
from applying NASA's scientists and engineers to research and
development work toward their utilization in project management and
operations. Given NASA's relatively fixed number of scientists and
engineers (remaining in a band between 11,500 and 13,000 from 1972
through 1990) the panel concludes that the agency has had no choice
but to make these shifts.
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The panel recommends that the Rdministrator of NRSA:
- Institute an annual critical position review for
all technlcal disciplines, identify the number and
professional levels of in-house coverage that are
essential to maintaining a reasonable degree of
technical expertise in each critical discipline,
and adjust recruiting and/or contracting plans
accordingly.
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SECTION 3
INTERNAL TECHNICAL MANAGEMENTPROCESSES
This topic deals with two types of pressures that tend to
limit the amount of time that NASA scientists and engineers have
for technical work or to greatly alter the nature of that work.
The first is the heavy time-consumption of scientists and engineers
in contract monitoring, oversight, and reporting requirements. The
second relates to changes in the way NASA conducts its internal
technical management of work.
Contract Types and Performance Accountability Processes
Senior NASA managers observed that different types of
contracts affect the behavior of contractors in different ways.
For example, incentive systems result in better performance than
traditional cost reimbursement contracts. The more responsibility
contractors are given, the better they perform.
Sixty-two percent of NASA's contract dollars, for fiscal year
1989, were under the Award Fee contract type. This is the principal
vehicle used for support contracts. This type requires active,
continuous involvement with the contractor, although it can be
adapted to provide for precise and measurable incentives - on cost
control, schedule adherence, and technical performance expectations
- with lessened requirement for daily involvement.
Many NASA and contractor managers believed that the NASA
contractor management methods are generally effective, but that
they are carried to extreme in day-to-day involvement in contractor
activities, are time consuming of technical talent on both sides,
and are heavily rigorous in terms of documentation requirements.
In earlier days, contractor performance was monitored and measured
in the three areas: cost, schedule, and technical performance.
Today, cost is seen as the principal driver and technical
performance monitoring is seen as weaker than before.
In award fee contracts the fee determining official and
members of the award fee board need to be very familiar with the
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program. Award fees should be based on clearly expressed
milestones, not time periods. If they are based on time periods it
was asserted by NASA managers that contractors become adept at
hiding problems until after evaluation dates, hoping to solve those
problems before the next evaluation period ends.
A more detailed description of the Award Fee process was
provided by another NASA manager. "The process is overseen by an
Award Fee Board. The board has appointed a committee for each
major contract, which the appropriate directorate head chairs. The
directorate head is the technical contract manager. Performance
criteria are provided by NASA to each contractor every six months.
Within each directorate, monitors assess specific aspects of the
contract. The monitors prepare strength and weakness reports,
against the performance criteria, and send them to the committee.
Mid term report cards are provided to the contractors at three
month intervals. Each six months, the committee makes an
assessment for the board. The board then reviews the assessment
and arrives at an award fee score. The score converts to an award
fee amount. If the contractors believe that a modification is in
order, the contractors have the option of appearing before the
board, or submitting a written statement to the board. Some do.
Grades are usually close to 90 on most of the contracts; the range
has been from 84 to 95 in the last three years."
It was generally agreed that on-site personnel in the
contractor's plant don't work well unless rotated frequently.
There was a general belief that if people are not rotated yearly,
they begin to think like the contractors. Objectivity is not
feasible. Eventually, they lack the ability to play an adversarial
role and their knowledge of the extent of problems suffers.
Several commented on NASA's move to consolidate support
contracts at some centers. The interviewees questioned whether the
intended economies had been realized. One senior NASA manager
noted, "Consolidation also moves the interface higher in both
organizations, and makes it more difficult for people at lower
levels to influence management of the work."
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Many interviewees noted that NASA's ability to know more than
contractors, let alone subcontractors, has diminished. The need for
stronger program control was called for by the managers and by 54.1
percent of the survey respondents.
On-going penetration of contractors, it was noted by several
interviewees, may be constrained by the lack of travel money and
available personnel. Travel limitations also prevent bringing new
employees to contractor plants for training.
Several contractors talked about the dynamics of contract
supervision. In trying to hold contractors accountable for their
work, they acknowledged that much depends on the individual
projects and individual NASA interfaces. NASA people, they
submitted, display suitable technical knowledge and are able to
penetrate as far as their knowledge goes, but in the final
analysis, they must trust the contractor. On occasions, there are
serious mismatches between the customer and the contractors. In
the experience of some contractors, there is not a lot of
difference in contractor technical management among NASA centers,
with the exception of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). At JPL,
the contractor tends to get smaller pieces of the program. JPL
serves as its own integrator and also builds some of its hardware
in-house.
Several contractors said that NASA now has a tendency to
micro-manage contractors, even to the point of signing off on
company internal standard operating procedures. They observed that
NASA management used to be oriented toward technical matters. Now,
the contractors see a lot more budgetary and administrative
orientation.
Finally, NASA and contractor interviewees noted that
"performance reviews" are very large, are scheduled far in advance,
and require extensive preparation by several layers of technical
talent on both sides. The NAPA research staff notes that this
process generally results in award fees in the 7-8 percent range,
and no adjective rating under "Excellent."
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The panel concludes that the Award Fee contract type as
implemented in NASA consumes more technical manpower on the part of
NASA and the contractors in both technical contract administration
and in the fee determination process than appears to be justified
by the narrow fee range (7-8 percent) and the consistent adjective
rating (Excellent) that results.
The panel further concludes that there is more involvement by
NASAengineers and scientists in internal contractor administrative
matters than may be prudent in terms of technical time.
The panel concludes that there is a leaning in NASA toward
reliance on the pre-announced, advance scheduled, heavily attended,
heavily documented formal contractor performance review processes
and less reliance on rotated on-site personnel or unannounced
contractor-site visits as means of assuring contractor
accountability.
As to the view that consolidation of support contractors has
moved management interfaces higher in both hierarchies, with fewer
opportunities for lower level civil servants to impact the work
deficiencies, the panel sees nothing wrong with moving management
interfaces higher between the parties if that was the intended
result of contract consolidation. If, however, it was an
unintended result and has indeed caused delays in the
identification and resolution of technical issues between the
parties at lower levels, then the panel believes the consolidation
concept to be worthy of further examination by NASA for adjustment
in form or operation if needed.
Program Decision Making and Coordination
In the view of many interviewees, NASA has gradually increased
its organizational layering, lowered the dollar thresholds on
decisions that require senior management approval, and greatly
increased its formal procedural requirements, both technical and
managerial. Numerous interviewees said the program office funding
and approval process has grown too complex and inflexible, with
justification of amounts as small as $70,000 having to go to
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Washington. These changes have diverted much technical time and
talent to meeting the requirements of a much more complex
administration environment than existed earlier in NASA's history.
NASAmanagers said that there is more emphasis on the schedule
rather than technical performance and cost, people are more process
rather than object oriented, there is too much bureaucratic
management of contractors and not enough technical management. One
manager observed, "There are more controls on our work, more
milestones, and more review processes that take time and delay
work. There is too much management at higher levels." Another
said, "People are not working as a team. There are too many
interfaces and too many people fighting over too few resources."
And finally, "There are too many meetings with viewgraphs. There
are no engineering reports presented for in depth review. There
are no ways to get a feel for accuracy of the data. Decisions are
based only on information presented."
The topic of risk aversion was also on the minds of many
managers and scientists and engineers. Several commented on the
NASA decision to require vastly increased contractor sign-offs at
various stages on the way to launch, spreading accountability and
increasing launch processing time. Interviewees noted that upper
management of both contractor and civil service organizations seem
to lack confidence in their technical workforce, and that there is
a reluctance to do anything for fear of doing something wrong.
There is less tolerance for failure within and outside the agency.
Challenger caused significant changes in the agency - more complex
organization and control and more information sharing mechanisms.
According to many scientists and engineers who responded to the
narrative section of the written questionnaire, responsibility is
not always clearly defined and people are not held accountable for
all project phases and activities.
Contractor executives expressed similar misgivings about the
amount of technical documentation, complex organization and
management issues, and the growing risk aversion in NASA. Comments
from the contractor community include, "NASA is becoming more
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process oriented than product oriented, and documentation takes
precedence over getting the job done," and "There is a reluctance
in NASA to shift appropriate management decisions to lower levels
in the organization. The aging bureaucracy is unwilling to take
appropriate risks anymore."
Other contractors believed that there is excessive attendance
by NASA people at Preliminary Design Reviews. They noted that NASA
people are generally accompanied by their support contractors.
Thus, it is not uncommon for hundreds of people to attend. Up to
6000 Review Item Discrepancies (RIDs) may be produced, at a single
review, many of which relate to decisions made long ago and are
thrown out. Contractors consider numerous RIDs to be an indication
of the lack of understanding most attendees have of what is going
on in the project being reviewed. The excessive attendance is also
seen as an indication that NASA people spend much effort protecting
themselves from future criticism. The contractors believe that a
better job could be done by a smaller team of experienced senior
people. On that same point, another senior NASA manager observed,
"The RID system is very paper intensive. There is no direct
exchange between the designer and the critic. The whole review
process has become very non-personalized, involving form rather
than substance."
The panel observes that it is not unusual for engineers and
scientists to voice displeasure over involvement in administrative
activities, excessive paperwork, budget exercises, excessive
management, insufficient delegations of authority, need for cross-
coordination, etc. The decibel level of the comments in NASA
suggests, however, that there is more time pressure from these
sources than usual. The panel concludes that NASA's technical
management practices should be redesigned to reduce the amount of
time that scientists and engineers must spend on non-technical
activities, or on an excess of paperwork.
The panel also questions whether the increased "sign-offs"
required of multiple contractors and NASA are really effective in
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increasing quality and reliability and to what extent they weaken
personal accountability.
The panel recommends that the Administrator of NASA:
- Modify the agency's contractor accountability
processes by tightening controls on
attendance/participation in formal reviews,
simplifying the award fee determination process,
increasing the use of unannounced contractor site
visits, and rotating NASA personnel stationed in
contractor plants.
- Seek opportunities for greater delegation of
resources/technical decision making authority,
reducing multi-party sign-off requirements with
encouragement of reasonable risk taking, and
improving lines of authority, responsibility, and
accountability in the technical management
organization.
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SECTION 4
RECRUITING AND RETENTION
IS NASA still able to attract high quality engineers and
scientists to the agency and retain them? Does the provision of
hands-on work opportunities influence hiring and retention? These
questions were also pursued through the NASA senior management
interviews and through the survey instrument administered to NASA
grade 12 and 15 scientists and engineers.
There is a perception, among senior managers as well as other
scientists and engineers that NASA is successful in hiring high
quality fresh-outs but has problems in hiring experienced people.
With senior people NASA is hard pressed to meet the salary
requirements, especially on the west coast.
It should be noted that NASA was able to hire 1,531 scientist
and engineers in 1989, twice as many as the previous year.
Scientists and engineers comprise approximately 55 percent of the
total work force. Normally about 600 scientist and engineers are
hired annually. Many hires have participated in the co-op program
although interviewees and the surveyed scientists and engineers at
the Grade 12 and 15 levels believed that recruiting should be more
diverse.
Although interviewees acknowledge that NASA still has an aura
with respect to recruitment, there are reservations about whether
NASA is hiring the "best" new graduates, because NASA salaries are
not competitive. For example, NASA pays a new engineer about
$26,000 per year and the average starting industry salary for an
engineering graduate $32,000.
In the opinion of interviewees, people are attracted to NASA
because of the mission. Nearly 70 percent of the survey
respondents came to work for NASA because of the space program and
the challenges presented. The ability to obtain hands-on
experience is not perceived to be a primary factor in recruiting
freshouts.
43
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
Fifty-five percent of the respondents thought that the good
points of working for the government outweigh the bad points. Only
14 percent disagreed.
The research staff also investigated the quality of new hires
as gauged by the educational preparation received and the work
attitudes of new hires once on board.
Since NASA freshouts have an aggregate 3.2 grade point
average, the selectivity in NASA recruiting is already established.
One observation, which was stated in different ways by many of the
interviewees was, "The quality of new hires today is as good or
better than in earlier periods. A great deal of knowledge transfer
has occurred from those involved in early space efforts to the
major schools of aerospace engineering. As a consequence, the
graduate today is much further along in understanding the
environment of space and the adjustments in thinking that are
required by it."
The quality of current hires in science and engineering was
perceived by survey respondents to be as good as ever by 49.5
percent. Twenty-three percent disagreed, and the rest were
neutral.
The turnover rate for scientists and engineers in NASA,
discounting retirements is very low (2 or 3 percent). However,
there is considerable opinion that holding trained people to
retirement age will probably not be as easy in the future because
of changes in the retirement laws.
Although there were a number of questions included in the
survey instrument relating to retirement plans and the perception
of government work, three of the issues raised in the questionnaire
bear directly on retention of scientists and engineers.
"I regard working for NASA as my lifetime career" was a
statement to which 64.4 percent of the respondents agreed, 20.5
p(:rcent were neutral, and 15.2 percent disagreed.
"I would quit if I found another job in the same line of work
with comparable benefits" captured only 12.2 percent of the agree
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and strongly agree categories. About 20 percent of the replies
were neutral and 68 percent disagreed with the notion of quitting.
Almost 50 percent of the respondents agreed that they are not
eager to change jobs but would change jobs if they could get a
better one. About 23 percent were neutral and 28 percent
disagreed.
Not surprisingly, many of the narrative comments dealt with
the inequity of pay and benefits accorded federal employees as
compared to their private sector counterparts. This type of
commentary was most prevalent at the Ames Research Center. At
Ames, strong sentiments were expressed in favor of locality based
pay. Because the Congress has, in October 1990, passed legislation
to accomplish pay reform for federal employees, including locality
pay, we have not included the numerous respondent comments on that
subject.
The panel concludes that NASA's ability to recruit freshout
scientists and engineers is good, that recruitment of experienced
scientists and engineers has been difficult but should improve as
a result of the recent pay reform legislation, especially the
geographic pay features.
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SECTION 5
IN-HOUSE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY
All of the topics and issues discussed thus far in this report
relate to one pivotal question - has NASA's in-house technical
capability eroded to such a degree that NASA is now less able to
fully exercise the technical leadership, contractor selection and
oversight, and in-house research and technology advancement roles
expected of it? In addition to questions on all the preceding
topics, specific questions on the topic of in-house technical
capability were asked of the senior NASA and contractor managers,
and of the Grade 12 and 15 scientists and engineers in the formal
survey. This section covers the views expressed on the overall
question, which supplement views expressed in connection with
specific topics earlier in this report.
By a ratio of four to one, there was general agreement among
NASA and contractor senior managers interviewed that NASA's in-
house technical capability has diminished. Among the Grade 12 and
15 engineers and scientists responding to the survey, only 22.5
percent of all respondents agreed that NASA in-house scientific and
engineering capabilities are as strong as in the past; 57.1 percent
disagreed.
The NASA management interviewees and the Grades 12 and 15
scientists and engineers noted that the principal reason NASA's in-
house technical capability has eroded was personnel ceilings
imposed by the federal government. According to several
interviewees and survey respondents, there was a ten year period
(1968 - 1979) where centers were unable to hire civil servants. As
a result, there was some loss of the experience base. Although
centers have started hiring again, new employees have not yet
developed the experience required. At one development center, it
was stated that in some fields the numbers of technical people are
enough, but the more experienced people are outnumbered up to 8:1
by newcomers. Another senior manager observed, "Since Challenger,
the budget has increased substantially but the NASA staff has grown
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only from about 23,000 to 24,000. I do not believe that staffing
levels need to grow in proportion to the budget, but I believe
technical oversight is being pushed to the limit."
Other managers noted that in-house capability in NASA had
decreased in areas ranging from the operation of laboratories and
in-house problem solving to the quality of support provided by
functional engineers and scientists to project personnel.
One research center manager noted, "The center has increased
its capability in aeronautics and space research in recent years.
The aeronautics research program is now larger than in 1970, but
space research and technology is still not large enough to provide
11
the technology base for future NASA programs.
The lack of technicians to support managers and professionals
working on projects was also perceived to affect the technical
capability of the staff and the culture of the centers. After the
seventies, NASA began to divest itself of technicians largely in
favor of contracting.
The status of NASA's in-house technical capability was also
examined through the use of scaled items on the questionnaire
distributed to Grades 12 and 15 scientists and engineers.
A statement that read, "NASA has in-house competence to make
responsible decisions in all programs for which it is responsible,"
elicited agreement by 49.2 percent; 17 percent were neutral; 33.8
percent disagreed.
Narrative questionnaire comments expanded these views.
Respondents from all centers noted that NASA's ability to be "a
smart buyer" and to make independent judgments about the quality of
the work has declined as the number of contractors has grown.
Several respondents cautioned that NASA has lost its real
experience base and will continue to slide unless the current trend
to contract is reversed. Two specific comments capture the essence
of the narrative inputs: "The question is not whether NASA has the
technical expertise, but does NASA use the technical expertise
appropriately?" and "As we contract out for more and more, the
experience belongs more and more to the contractors."
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A recent study by the agency was directed at the problem of
civil service/support contractor mix. The study resulted in a need
to convert many support contractor positions to civil service
positions and to add additional civil servants beyond that
conversion. The panel's recommendations reflect its support of
that need.
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SECTION 6
OBSERVATIONS ON ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES FOR NASA
During the course of this study a limited inquiry was made by
the research staff into the question of alternative forms for NASA
centers such as a Federally Funded Research and Development Center
(FFRDC), or a Government Owned-Contractor Operated facility (GOCO).
There was some interest at KSC by contractor and NASA managers
in the GOCO approach, although the interest was at a more
philosophical than practical level. An outline of the operating
benefits of an FFRDC was presented by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(which is an FFRDC). There was some interest in the FFRDC approach
expressed by NASA managers at the Ames Research Center, principally
because of civil service salary competitiveness issues in the San
Francisco Bay area.
Whether GOCO or FFRDC, the benefits appear to the panel to be
greater flexibility in personnel and pay operations, and removal
from civil service ceilings, with no assertions made to reduced
cost of operation or to improved technical capability beyond that
which could result from greater flexibilities in hiring and ceiling
relief.
The panel believes that NASA, in its basic organic form, has
produced extraordinary technological results under extraordinary
circumstances - and has led this nation to a position of world pre-
eminence in space research, development, and exploration.
The panel believes that for NASA to embark on some other
organic form for reasons other then achieving a clearly major
advance in technical capability at an equal or reduced cost would
not be prudent, would likely consume years of study and negotiation
while present issues go less well attended, and would further
dilute the presence in the government of strong and able scientists
and engineers to advance and protect the public interest in this
important publicly funded program.
The panel concludes that the public interest is best served by
retaining the present organic form of NASA and, through cooperative
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efforts of the Congress and the Administration, strengthening its
ability to perform its statutory role where necessary.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
NASA has operated with a relatively fixed number of scientists
and engineers (11,500 to 13,000) for the last eighteen years, while
the program/project mix and diversification of center activities
has grown.
The long-term nature of some of NASA's programs, and the
multiplicity of payloads and experiments requiring project
management, have caused a movement out of the core science and
engineering functions of research, design, test, and evaluation
into project management and flight program support operations that
are expected to be of continuing importance.
In efforts to exert tighter management controls after the
Challenger accident, the agency has instituted internal technical
management practices that are seen to consume inordinate amounts of
scientist and engineer time in non-technical pursuits.
The nature of the contract type used for support contractors
requires a great deal of technical time to monitor and administer,
with resulting fees and adjective ratings in a very tight range.
This calls into question the amount of technical effort expended
and the marginal benefit provided.
The combination of those events has caused NASA to contract
more and more of its technical work, until it is now in a situation
where some technical functions are being performed by contractors
that should be performed in greater measure by NASA. The weight of
expertise in some key technical disciplines has also moved to
support contractors.
NASA is able to recruit quality newly graduated scientists and
engineers with no difficulty. Its difficulty in attracting more
experienced scientists and engineers should be aided by the recent
pay reform legislation.
NASA does not have enough hands-on technical work in-house to
provide the direct developmental opportunities to its scientists
and engineers necessary to hone their technical skills for later
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roles in conceiving new programs, managing major projects, and
overseeing technical contractors.
NASA's in-house technical capability is stretched too thin,
not only due to program/project mix and diversity, but also due to
its growing long-term project operations support role and its
internal management practices.
NASA's in-house technical capability has eroded, and is in
need of immediate strengthening, preferably in NASA's present
organic form.
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SUMMARYOF RECOMMENDATIONS
The critical technical strength of NASA has long resided in
the civil service scientists and engineers at the centers.
Pressures to reduce government employment, to support a more
diverse array of technical activities, and to convert functions to
contractor performance have resulted in important changes
throughout NASA. Most important has been a gradual erosion of NASA
civil service technical capability at the centers.
The panel recognizes that there are various ways and
combinations in which government research and development
activities can be carried out. It is the panel's strong preference
given the history, culture, and past performance of NASA, that the
agency take actions to rebuild its civil service in-house technical
capability. If circumstances dictate a civil-service/support
contractor technical performance mixture it is imperative, in the
panel's judgment, that such a mixture be in accordance with a plan
and NASA guidance to the centers on which technical functions are
important to be performed consistently by civil service scientists
and engineers. The panel believes that the guidelines contained in
the 1962 "Report to the President on Government Contracting for
Research and Development," by David Bell and others, still provides
a sound basis for such a plan.
The panel recommends that the Administrator of NASA:
i. Prepare and issue guidance on technical functional areas
to be reserved for in-house civil service performance.
2. Convert contracted technical functions essential to in-
house capability from support contractors to in-house
performance and rebuild strength in specific technical
disciplines critical to agency programs and objectives.
Ceiling relief should be sought if required.
3. Provide policy guidance to the centers to retain in-house
sufficient project, experiment, advance development, and
research activities to provide more hands-on technical
work by civil service scientists and engineers.
55
.•
.
•
Examine the project mix at each center against agency and
center goals and objectives. Select those with marginal
contributions and/or staffing for cancellation or
transfer. Assess all projects for suitability of
specific center assignment, avoiding intercenter overlap
or duplication where possible.
Institute an annual critical position review for all
technical disciplines, identify the number and
professional levels of in-house coverage that are
essential to maintaining a reasonable degree of technical
expertise in each critical discipline, and adjust
recruiting and/or contracting plans accordingly.
Modify the agency's contractor accountability processes
by tightening controls on attendance/participation in
formal reviews, simplifying the award fee determination
process, increasing the use of unannounced contractor
site visits, and rotating NASA personnel stationed in
contractor plants.
Seek opportunities for greater delegation of
resources/technical decision making authority, reducing
multi-party sign-off requirements with encouragement of
reasonable risk taking, and improving lines of authority,
responsibility, and accountability in the technical
management organization.
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8. JIM SELLERS, DEPUTY CHIEF, ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION
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MARSHALLSPACE FLIGHT CENTER INTERVIEWS (6)
i ,
2.
3.
1
5.
6.
JACK LEE, DIRECTOR
DON BEAN, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS
BOB SHEPPARD, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTIONAL AND PROGRAM
SUPPORT
PORTER BRIDWELL, MANAGER, SHUTTLE PROJECT OFFICE
WOODY BETHAY, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR
GEORGE McDONOUGH, DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
NASA ALUMNI INTERVIEWS (6)
1 PAUL DEMBLING, RETIRED GENERAL COUNSEL
2 CHRIS KRAFT, RETIRED DIRECTOR, JSC
3 BILL LUCAS, RETIRED DIRECTOR, MSFC
4 CHUCK MATHEWS, RETIRED ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR
5 MERV AULT, RETIRED DIRECTOR OF ENERGY PROGRAMS, LeRC
6 JOE SIVO, RETIRED CHIEF OF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, LeRC
PLUS 7 ADDITIONAL FROM THE RANKS OF INDUSTRY
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INDUSTRY INTERVIEWS (22)
BOEING (2)
i. GEORGEDAVIS, OPERATIONSMANAGER(KSC)
2. BOB HAGER, MANAGER,HUNTSVILLE DIVISION
BROWNAND ROOT-NORTHROP(i)
i. HARRY CLAGGETT*, FORMERMANAGER, JSC SUPPORTGROUP
EG&G (i)
i. J. R. DUBAY, PRESIDENT, FLORIDA OPERATIONS
LOCKHEED(9)
i. BOB YOUNG, PRESIDENT, LOCKHEEDENGINEERING AND SCIENCE
COMPANY
2. A. GUASTAFERRO*, VICE PRESIDENT, SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAMS,
LOCKHEEDMISSILE AND SPACE CO.
3. DOUGSARGENT, MANAGER,SHUTTLE PROCESSINGCONTRACT
(KSC)
4. BERT BULKIN, DIRECTOR, SCIENTIFIC SPACE PROGRAMS,
LOCKHEED MISSILE AND SPACE COMPANY
5. WALT OLSTAD*, DIRECTOR, R&D PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT,
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, LOCKHEED MISSILE AND
SPACE COMPANY
6. HENRY BOWES, FORMER DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING,
LOCKHEED ENGINEERING & SCIENCE
7. MAURICE MILLER, LOCKHEED ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE
COMPANY
8. MARV WHITE, LOCKHEED ENGINEERING AND SCIENCE COMPANY
9. ROBERT NELSON*, (RETIRED)
MARTIN-MARIETTA(l)
i. TOM YOUNG*, PRESIDENT
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McDONNELLDOUGLAS(2)
i. GENE SPILGER, DIRECTOR OF SPACE STATION (KSC)
2. CHUCKJACOBSEN, MANAGERSUPPORTOPERATIONS (JSC)
ROCKWELL(4)
i. GEORGEMERRICK, VICE PRESIDENT, AEROSPACETECHNOLOGIES
AND SYSTEMSSAFETY
2. BOB PASTER, PRESIDENT, ROCKETDYNEDIVISION
3. STEVE DOMOKIS, VICE PRESIDENT (RETIRED), ROCKETDYNE
DIVISION
4. GLYNN LUNNEY*, MANAGER,STSOCCONTRACT
SPACE INDUSTRIES(l)
i. JOE ALLEN*, VICE PRESIDENT, (FORMERSCIENTIST
ASTRONAUT)
TELEDYNE-BROWNENGINEERING(I)
i. JOE MOQUIN, PRESIDENT (RETIRED)
* NASA ALUMNI
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APPENDIX A
PART I
SUMMARYOF QUESTIONNAIREFINDINGS
A wide range of questions were posed to NASA scientists and
engineers at the Grades 12 and 15 levels in the following areas:
o Demographics
o Nature of Work
o Hands-On Activities/Contracting
o Image of the Public Service; and
o Recruitment and Retention
Part IV of this appendix presents the survey instrument, which was
comprised of a number of closed-ended questions with mutually
exclusive structured responses and a narrative section.
After completing the first five sections of the questionnaire,
respondents were able to comment on these and other topics by
providing narrative statements. In the narrative section of the
questionnaire, respondents commented on many factors, including the
appropriateness and types of work performed by contractor personnel
versus civil servants at NASA centers, the number of opportunities
for hands-on work, the impacts of the external environment,
institutional and managerial shortcomings, special financing needs
of space and aeronautics programs, and declining public confidence
in government.
Parts II and III present the survey results from the closed
and open ended parts in detail, and Part IV present the survey
instrument. This section integrates principal findings derived
from the areas of the questionnaire dealing with Nature of Work,
Hands-On Activities/ Contracting, Image of the Public Service,
Recruitment and Retention, and narrative comments.
The largest number of GS-12 and GS-15 respondents, 31.8
percent, were involved in the management or administration of
research or development; the second largest number of respondents,
16.3 percent, were involved in applied research; and the third
largest number of respondents, 13.7 percent, were involved in
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operations as primary work activities. As secondary work
activities, 16 percent of respondents were engaged in development,
followed by those engaged in applied research, 14.3 percent,
followed by those engaged in report and technical writing, editing
and information retrieval. Although each of the functions listed
above requires a separate effort, each is highly related to the
others and there are overlaps and merges of functions, different
interpretations of functions and cyclic involvement of individuals
in functional activities.
The bulk of respondents (61.9 percent) believed that the
utilization of experienced scientists and engineers at their
centers was good and excellent. The utilization of young
scientists and engineers was perceived to be good and excellent by
63.5 percent of the respondents. Although the majority of
scientists and engineers responded positively to the subjective
concept of utilization, many provided written comments that dealt
with the frequent failure by management to place a premium on
technical quality achievement by individuals. Several respondents
reported that a principal defect in the management was the
inability to relate rewards to utilization of staff.
The type of technical responsibility most frequently exercised
by respondents was planning and organizing projects. About 36
percent of the respondents reported that planning and organization
were the most frequently exercised type of responsibility. About
18 percent of the respondents indicated problem solving as the
next type of technical responsibility most frequently exercised.
The last question related to the section of the questionnaire
entitled Nature of Work required a nominal response of yes or no.
The question was: "Since joining NASA has the diversity (variety
and complexity of work) increased at your center?" Of the 1,537
respondents who answered this question, 76 percent replied yes and
24 percent replied no. Although the consequences of growing
variety and complexity of programs were not explicitly requested in
this part of the questionnaire, many narrative comments were linked
to this phenomenon. For example, respondents indicated that
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projects have become more comprehensive and longer, often calling
for more interdisciplinary talents; more formal reporting systems;
increased financial concerns; more time on government requirements
for financial accountability; increasingly more complicated admini-
strative processes, and so on. Many tames, narrative comments on
the diversity of programs turned into statements against large
projects. Some respondents believed that, generally, large
projects are poorly conceived, unfocused, inadequately funded and
never completed. The breadth and depth of large projects, it was
noted, led to unrealistic expectations, greater inefficiencies and
the dedication of large numbers of project staff to administrative
matters. A few people noted that the plethora of data stemming
from planning and tracking of large projects has resulted in
information overload. It was also observed that pre-contract
competition absorbs a considerable number of scientific and
engineering personnel, especially in connection with large
projects. Weaving ways through these troublesome observations were
the needs to set work priorities and to consciously strive for
balanced allocations between "big" and "small" projects. Many
narrative statements pointed out that decisions pertaining to
missions and roles have been approached as primarily budgetary
matters.
The third part of the questionnaire focused on hands-on
activities and contractor support. Duties performed by contractor
personnel that were reported most frequently include representing
NASA at meetings (58.4 percent of respondents), reviewing progress
(49.4 percent), defining assignments (37.9 percent), and monitoring
performance (35.7 percent). Comparatively few comments were made
on the quality of contractor performance in specific program areas
except for space station and the impacts of contractor performance
on government decision making.
Many narrative comments focused on employing contractors in
inappropriate areas. Respondents said that contractors are per-
forming more significant tasks than NASAemployees, and there were
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pleas for reform. They also cited discontent with contractor
accountability, responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness.
When those surveyed were asked which types of support provided
by contractors exceed what should be provided by the private
sector, 33.1 percent of the respondents replied none. However,
37.8 percent noted excesses in engineering and technical services;
29.3 percent cited excesses in research and development and 21.8
percent said there were excesses with program control. Many of the
narrative comments stated that contractors perform critical work
that should be performed by civil servants, and that this had
resulted in the deterioration of NASA's in-house capability and in
an irreversible dependency on contractors. In spite of some
narrative comments on the exodus of government experts to private
firms, over half of the respondents (53.7 percent) disagreed and
strongly disagreed that NASA is less efficient than industry.
Over 90 percent of the respondents saw a strong positive
relationship between hands-on experience to proficiency, and 85
percent said that direct experience, or learning by doing, is tied
to the best results. Narrative comments stated the need to acquire
technical competence through "hands-on" experience. Such
experience, it was noted, can effectively convey "lessons learned"
to managers and staff and result in more effective contract
monitoring and control, dramatically reducing the likelihood of
project failure. "To the extent that project managers do not
understand what is happening on their projects due to the lack of
direct experience, problems will continue to surface," a respondent
wrote.
Although 80 percent of the respondents stated that NASA
provides challenging work, almost 75 percent of the respondents
said that a great deal of challenging work is performed by
contractors, not NASA. Another statement, used to check the
responses to the prior question in less vague terms, also elicited
large amounts of agree and strongly agree votes. The statement
was: "The trend toward expanding the use of contractors has
shifted challenging tasks from NASA to contractors". It resulted
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in a combined agree and strongly agree response rate of 80.9
percent. Although one of the hardest tasks facing senior managers
in NASA is to strike a balance between work performed by NASA and
work performed by contractors, a large number of scientists and
engineers stated that they did not believe in tight controls with
respect to the number of contractors and believed that overly rigid
controls on the numbers of government and private sector employees
would result in disbenefits. Respondents also said it would be a
serious mistake to sacrifice reasonable flexibility and adopt the
alternative of formal staffing requirements, in the form of
personnel ceilings. Respondents recognized that in an attempt to
reduce the size of government, NASA has achieved an imbalance;
offering strict limitations on what the private sector should do
however, will not solve the problem of "shadow government."
When respondents were asked whether they strongly agreed,
agreed, were neutral, disagreed or strongly disagreed to the
affirmation that the future roles of contractors should be more
limited, 58.5 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly
agreed. As mentioned, many commentators pointed out that finding
new and improved ways to control the growth of contractors will be
extremely difficult. Prescriptive remedies aimed at devising a way
to achieve a balance between the public and the private per-
formances of research and development in aeronautics and space do
not exist.
The bottom line of many narrative comments relating to roles
of contractors is that it is in the best interest of NASA to have
more control over its work and more input into it. Respondents
suggested that work allocations between civil servants and
contractors should be examined on a task by task basis. They also
noted patterns and ratios of personnel working in support of
scientists and engineers, such as skilled crafts workers and shop
and production workers, need to be examined.
A strong plurality of respondents (65.7 percent) said that the
public interest would be better served if less technical work were
contracted out to the private sector. Narrative reflections to
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this sentiment were furnished by employees who noted that
consequences of contracting need to be fully appreciated and new
means for assuring accountability need to be investigated. "Given
the nature of the space business" one respondent wrote, "no ideal
solutions to satisfying the public interest are likely to come to
pass." Several respondents provided negative comments about
attempts to curb waste and abuse that stem from contracting methods
such as incentive contracts.
When asked to agree or disagree with a statement that in-house
management/administrative capabilities of NASA are as strong as in
the past, 48.8 percent of the respondents disagreed and strongly
disagreed. It was also argued that although scientists and
engineers may be in the proper supply and strength in some areas
there is a shortage of more creative and capable individuals in
other areas. This outlook was reinforced by narrative comments
that underscored specific weaknesses of NASA management and that
spelled out the need to match the management of complex, changing
technologies with the art of leadership. One example frequently
cited was the need for individuals to anticipate and to be more
adaptive to change rather than to simply react to events.
In addition, 73.5 percent of respondents strongly agreed and
agreed that too much of the scientific and engineering efforts in
NASA are spent preparing and selling programs. Selling programs
was a salient complaint of a great number of people who wrote
comments. ("Selling" includes internal as well as external
advocacy efforts.) Although commentators acknowledged the
uncertain nature of NASA funding streams and the fact that
budgetary constraints are paramount problems of our time,
commentators noted the increasing position of selling and the
politicization of centers and the agency as a whole. They said
this had resulted in: disturbing consequences such as multiple and
fragmented functions and tasks with too little interlock;
unbalanced and inadequate coverages of work in research and
development, operations, management and administration; confusion
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about objectives of work; and diminished motivation for technical
work.
Respondents also said the competition among centers has
weakened the central authority of Headquarters, leading to what was
termed an excess of "home rule." Several people observed that a
sense of community and cohesion is missing and that this will not
occur unless central direction, coordination and leadership are
supplied by strong agency management. Several respondents pointed
out that it would be highly prudent to strengthen the capabilities
of Headquarters.
Finally, 71.1 percent of the scientists and engineers
responded positively to the statement that engineers should be able
to acquire cradle to grave experience on projects or be able to
accompany projects through all phases of their life cycles.
Respondents believed that accompanying a project throughout its
cycle of design, development, and test, offers valuable experience
that is essential to developing program management skills. They
also pointed out that generally very large projects are not
conducive to cradle to grave experience opportunities because they
result in the isolation of technical groups.
Many narrative commentators pointed out that at the Goddard
Space Flight Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center, efforts
were underway to ensure that a number of projects or project
component developments and system tests are undertaken in-house and
that similar efforts should occur at other installations. Some
scientists and engineers also linked the notions of hands-on
experience and cradle-to-grave project involvement to acquiring
systems engineering and project integration skills. "Hands-on
capabilities can hasten the achievement of systems integration," a
survey participant observed. Although people recognize that work
patterns have changed because of computer-based technologies, the
conventional approach of developing "hands-on" capabilities is
still considered to be highly desirable. In fact, the acceleration
of research and innovation by machine may have increased the need
for added "hands-on" learning, according to several staff.
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Fifteen strongly agree - strongly disagree items comprised the
next section of the questionnaire, which was aimed at collecting
observations about the health and viability of NASA and the
government as a whole.
Although 67.6 percent of the respondents disagreed and
strongly disagreed that the government, as an employer, rates
higher than other sectors, over 76 percent of the respondents said
they would recommend NASA as an employer and 84.0 percent said they
were doing important work as NASA employees. The premium NASA
employees place on important work and standards of excellence was
a central feature of the written comments.
Without going into detail, the responses to this section of
the questionnaire, together with the narrative comments, clearly
show that the government is perceived as an inadequate employer.
However, NASA employees see significant differences between
themselves and other government employees who, they believe, are
less able to cope with their responsibilities. The government, as
a whole, was described as not up to the task of successfully
implementing programs for which it is responsible. There was the
strong perception, however, that the private sector does not
provide a promising alternative to accomplishing R&D tasks and that
NASA must regain control over the balance and direction of its
programs.
NASA employees cast a more important role for themselves than
for other federal employees. In fact, they stated that aeronautics
and space research and development requires more responsibility,
individual creativity, and productivity than other government
activities. Over 40 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly
agreed that most scientific and engineering students would prefer
working for the private sector. Slightly over 40 percent of the
respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed that government
research and development is less efficient than the private sector.
The primary advantages of the private sector, in the respondents'
views, were pay, benefits, and lessening of red tape.
In narratives, many employees observed that the rhetoric and
reality of recent program failures suggest that NASA is becoming
more like the rest of the government, but the majority still
believed NASAwas more satisfying and meaningful than other federal
departments and agencies, A few warned that unless NASA defined
priorities and pursued fewer initiatives it would turn into an
agency characterized by continual conflict, risk aversion,
bureaucratic politics and program flaws, thus discrediting its
reputation and exhausting its credit.
Although some scientists and engineers pointed to adverse
federal governmental trends that have affected the way NASA does
business, the majority of respondents perceived that NASA's own
administrative system is weak and that NASA employees do not posses
the same work ethic and sense of commitment as previously. They
suggested that old values were shaken or shattered by the Vietnam
War, the baby boom generation, and so on, and that new ones have
not risen to replace them. Respondents also said that team work is
essential to a successful NASA and that it is not as strong as it
should be. Of fundamental significance to the notion of the
project team is the relationship among centers. Barriers between
scientific and engineering personnel at different centers have been
erected. Respondents saw these barriers as largely communication
ones that have emphasized differences among organizations rather
than unity of purpose and common goals.
In another connection, the relationship between NASA and
Congress was cited as a dimension constraining the functional
abilities of NASA. It would, according to respondents, be improved
if legislation stabilized expenditures for technological projects,
quality and continuity of technical efforts, and if it were
orientated toward long run objective.
Finally, NASA was thought to be limited because its resources
are limited. Respondents said the scale of its activity does not
constitute a manageable expense. One employee viewed the problem
differently. "Space exploration," he noted, "costs a great deal;
of late, it also has accomplished too little. If NASA continues to
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disappoint the public, the search for an alternative may be sought
rather aggressively."
The last topic of the questionnaire dealt with recruitment and
retention, which do not appear to be serious problems at NASA. In
fact, 74.9 percent of the employees who responded to the question-
naire are satisfied with their progress at NASA and 64.4 percent
regard working for NASA as their lifetime career. This is not to
say that a larger than desirable number of scientists and engineers
at some centers do not resign; but even at the Ames Research
Center, where inadequate salaries are a major concern, only 21
percent of the respondents did not regard NASA as their lifetime
career. In sum, in the context of NASA, shortages and dislocations
of people do not appear to be a cause for great concern. In fact,
at some centers, narrative respondents saw stagnation as more of a
problem.
A word about salary and benefits. Although some employees at
each center cited low levels of satisfaction with pay, a very large
percentage of Ames employees voiced strong opinions about the need
to receive more money and better benefits. In support of the
objective of assuring high levels of professional competence in the
NASA establishment, they believed Congress should promptly enact
proposals for higher salaries at certain geographical locations.
Retention of scientist and engineers at other centers was not
generally tied to money; the central importance of challenging work
was the main reason for joining and remaining at all NASA
installations.
i0
APPENDIX A
PART II
CLOSE-ENDED QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
The Survey Design
A written questionnaire was used to collect data for thls
study. The stratified sample of 2,243 GS-12 and 15 NASA scientists
and engineers at nine installations was drawn from among the 3,661
Grades 12 and 15 scientists and engineers on the Personnel
Management Information System (PMIS) roster. The confidence
interval for the mean of each of the samples was 95 percent; thus,
the standard error of each of the samples was .05 or 5 percent.
Table 1 reports the composition of both populations and samples of
Grades 12 and 15 scientists and engineers by NASA installation.
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Table 1
Sizes of Survey Populations and Samples
of Grades 12 and 15
Scientists and Engineers by NASA Installation
NASA Installation
Ames Research Center 141
Goddard Space
Flight Center 225
Johnson Space Center 385
Kennedy Space Center 292
Langley Research Center 186
Lewis Research Center** 272
Marshall Space
Flight Center 264
Stennis Space Center 22
Headquarters 3
Population
Grade 12 Grade 15
Sample*
Grade 12 Grade 15
198 108 132
379 144 191
331 195 180
119 169 92
200 127 132
161 162 118
192 159 132
8 22 8
283 3 165
*The sizes of some of the samples were slightly modified to
augment the number of subjects within each sample with the
additions of five to eight subjects because of the prevalent
opinion that individuals might be on vacation during the month of
August and would not have opportunity to be included in the sample.
**The method for data collection was transmission of the
questionnaire by personnel offices at each center, accompanied by
letters of explanation and return envelopes. At the Lewis Research
Center, 280 questionnairs were initially distributed to employees
who were not necessarily Grades 12 and 15 scientists and engineers.
As a result, 280 additional questionnaires were coded and delivered
to Grades 12 and 15 scientists and engineers with a request stating
that if respondents had completed questionnaires earlier they were
not to fill out questionnaires. It should be noted that all of the
returns from Lewis were carefully monitoried and processed. The
total response rate takes into account the 560 questionnaires
distributed to Lewis employees during two stages.
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The purpose of this study was to examine the balance between
NASA employees and contractors and to discover the impacts of the
current mix on NASA's in-house capability. The researchers and
members of the Academy panel believed that Grades 12 and 15
scientists and engineers would provide a worthwhile vantage point
for investigating the phenomena under study. To capture the
dynamics of situation, Grade 12 scientists and engineers who were
expected to be employed by NASA less than five years and Grade 15
scientists and engineers who generally have been employed for a
longer period of time and thus would be able to discuss changes
over a longer period of time, were designated as respondents.
The survey instrument consisted of six parts: Demographics,
Nature of Work, "Hands-on"/Contracting, Image of the Public
Service, Recruitment/Retention and a Concluding Statement. The
self-administered instrument was comprised of 83 items that called
for nominal, ordinal and interval data. Several of the items were
closed questions with five point rating scales and descriptions
such as excellent, good, fair, poor and very poor. There were many
disagree - agree items with statements located at the ends of
continuums. Checking boxes or circling numbers were the main tasks
required.
Questions pertaining to demographics were placed in the first
part of the survey because they elicited straight-forward
information, thus getting respondents "into the survey." Open
ended comments and observations comprised the final section of the
instrument. There were different types of print to distinguish
between words that were instructions and questions (e.g., upper
case and lower case letters). Optional wordings on certain
questions were in parentheses. No skip patterns were used.
Finally, the length of the questionnaire was resolved after taking
into account cost, effect on response rate, and limits of the
respondents' willingness to answer questions.
Researchers submitted each of the questions to current and
former NASA employees and Academy panel members for review and
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conducted pretests with potential respondents. The researchers
promised questionnaire recipients that answers would be treated
confidentially and that responses would not be associated with
individuals.
Response Rates
The overall responses rate to the survey is a guide to the
representativeness of the sample respondents. A total of 2,243
questionnaires were sent, and 1,615 responses were returned for an
overall response rate of 72.0 percent. Forty-eight responses did
not arrive in time for the data analysis phase. Generally, a
response rate of 50 percent is adequate for analysis and a response
rate of 60 percent or more is good. There were no follow-up
mailings. The questionnaire was administered during August and
September, prime vacation months.
Response rates to the questionnaire by sex were: 1,336 (85.8
percent) males and 221 (14.2 percent) females, Ten respondents did
not state their sex. The eldest respondent was born in 1917. One
hundred and six (6.8 percent) of the respondents were born in 1962,
the year in which the greatest number of U.S. births occurred. The
break down of the respondents by age shows that 463 respondents
(29.9 percent) were 51 to 60 years old: 404 (26.1 percent) were 30
years old or younger; 321 (20.8 percent) were 41 - 50 years of age;
280 (18.1 percent) were 31 - 40 years of age; and 78 (5.0 percent)
were 61 years of age or over. Nineteen respondents did not furnish
information relating to data of birth.
The center with the greatest number of respondents was the
Lewis Research Center: 278 or 17.9 percent. The rest were: The
Johnson Space Center, 239 or 15.4 percent; Ames Research Center,
225 or 14.6 percent; Langley Research Center, 192 or 12.4 percent;
Kennedy Space Center, 185 or 11.9 percent; Goddard Space Flight
Center, 169 or 10.9 percent; Marshall Space Flight Center, 162 or
10.4 percent; Headquarters 82 or 5.3 percent; and Stennis, 21 or
1.4 percent. The number of respondents at each center who filled
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out the questionnaire is reported as a percentage of the entire
number of respondents who responded to the questionnaire.
Table 2 reports the response rates for each installation.
Table 2
Response Rates by NASA Installation
NASA Installation
Ames Research Center
Goddard Space
Flight Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space
Flight Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Marshall Space
Flight Center
Stennis Space Center
Headquarters
Sample Size Response Rate
Frequencies Percent
240 225 93.8%
335 169 50.4%
375 239 63.7%
261 185 70.8%
261 192 73.6%
560 278 49.6%
291 162 55.6%
30 21 70.0%
168 82 48.8%
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The educational level of the respondents was high. Table 3
shows the highest levels of educational attainment and fields of
study of the respondents.
Table 3
Educational Attainment of Respondents
Highest Level of
Educational Attainment
College Graduate
(Bachelor's Degree)
Some Graduate Work
Graduate Degree
(M.S., M.A., LL.B.)
Doctorate (Ph.D)
Other
Frequencies Percent
398 25.5%
378 24.2%
510 32.7%
247 15.8%
29 1.9%
Field of Study
o Agriculture,
o Biology,
o Engineering,
o Math,
o Education,
o Physics,
o Health,
o Management and
Other Fields
Frequencies Percent
2 (0.2%)
23 (1.5%)
1,107 (71.3%)
93 (6.0%)
3 (0.2%)
200 (12.9%)
9 (0.6%)
115 (7.4%)
The earliest date that the highest educational degree was
granted was 1936. In 1985, the greatest number of respondents
(119) received their highest degrees.
Exactly 1,387 (88.8 percent) respondents were in the Grades 12
and 15 categories. Six hundred and forty-eight (41.5 percent) of
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the respondents were Grade 12 and 739 (47.3 percent) of the
respondents were Grade 15. The remaining 175 (11.2 percent)
respondents ranged from Grade 7 to Senior Executive Service. They
were classified as "Other." Most of the respondents in the "Other"
category were Lewis Research Center employees who received the
first batch of questionnaires distributed at Lewis.
Two hundred thirty-six (15.2 percent) of the respondents
participated in the co-op program and later accepted NASA
employment offers.
Table 4 presents the number of years respondents have worked
at NASA. Five did not answer this question.
Years with NASA
Less than 1 year
1 year to less
than 2 years
2 years to less
than 3 years
3 years to less
than 5 years
5 years to less
than I0 years
i0 years to less
than 15 years
15 or more years
Table 4
Tenure of Respondents at NASA
Frequencies Percent
54 3.5%
120 7.7%
58 3.7%
216 13.8%
289 18.5%
113 7.2%
712 45.6%
Respondents identified their occupations prior to joining
NASA. Seven hundred and thirty-six (47.0 percent) were students:
15 (i.0 percent) worked for state or local government; 446 (28.5
percent) had been employed by the private sector; 71 (4.5 percent)
had been in the military; 165 (10.5 percent) worked for another
federal agency; 5 (0.3 percent) were unemployed; and 121 (7.7
17
percent) had been engaged in other occupations. Eight respondents
did not answer this question.
Generally, the rate of non-response to individual questions
was low, five or six people. Possible reasons why those who
responded to the questionnaire did not provide information
regarding all items were: employees were unable to fill out
specific items because they did not have sufficient knowledge
concerning the questions; employees did not wish to express their
views because they were afraid of being identified; employees
believed topics were too sensitive; employees were uncomfortable
with the choices of answers provided; employees were threatened by
the uses to which they felt the data would be put; or employees
simply overlooked certain questions.
Nature of Work
The second section of the questionnaire was Nature of Work.
The first item asked the respondents to select primary and
secondary work activities from a list of thirteen items.
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Table 5 shows the frequencies and percentages of employees
engaged in these work activities as indications of primary work
efforts.
Table 5
Primary Work Ac%ivi%ies
Activities
Management/Administration
of Research or Development 499
Management/Administration of
Non Research or Development 243
Teaching, training, guiding
or counseling 24
Basic Research 9
Applied Research 255
Development 156
Report and Technical
Writing Editing,
Information Retrieval 44
Design of Equipment,
Processes, Models 85
Quality Control, Testing,
Evaluation 46
Operations 215
Statistical Work 9
Computer Applications 67
Other 82
Cases
Frequencies Percent
31.8%
15.5%
1.5%
6.0%
16.3%
10.0%
2.8%
5.4%
2.9%
13.7%
0.6%
4.3%
5.2%
The number of respondents engaged in managing or administering
research and development activities as a primary activity was more
than the double of those involved in applied research, the next
highest primary activity.
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Table 6 presents cases of secondary work activities on an
aggregate basis. Note that development was the most frequent
secondary work activity and statistics was the least frequent
primary and secondary work activities.
Table 6
Secondary Work Activities
Activities
Management/Administration
of Research or Development 125
Management/Administration of
Non Research or Development 158
Teaching, training, guiding
or counseling 125
Basic Research i00
Applied Research 224
Development 250
Report and Technical
Writing, Editing,
Information Retrieval 44
Design of Equipment,
Processes, Models 124
Quality Control, Testing,
Evaluation 55
Operations 178
Statistical Work 21
Computer Applications 139
Other 57
Cases
Frequencies Percent
8.0%
10.1%
8.0%
6.4%
14.3%
16.0%
13.9%
7.9%
3.5%
Zl.4%
1.3%
8.9%
3.6%
2O
Tables 7 and 8 show primary and secondary activities by Grades
12, 15 and Other. As a primary activity, Grade 12 employees were
frequently engaged in development and operations while Grade 15
employees were frequently engaged in managing or administering
research and development and non-research and non-development
activities. Some employees selected more than one activity as
their primary activity and as their secondary activity.
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Activities
Management/Administration
of Research/Development
Management/Administration of
Non Research/Development
Teaching, Training, Guiding
or Counseling
Basic Research
Applied Research
Development
Report and Technical
Writing Editing,
Information Retrieval
Design of Equipment,
Processes. Models
Quality Control,
Testing, Evaluation
Operations
Statistical Work
Computer Applications
Other Activities
Table 7
Primary Work Activities By
GS-12
Freq %
67 10.3%
70 10.7%
12 1.7%
30 4.6%
148 22.7%
97 14.9%
27 4 . 1%
72 11.0%
33 5.1%
123 18.9%
7 1.1%
54 8.3%
42 6.4%
Grade
Grade
GS-15 Other Total Cases
Freq % Freq % Freq %
393 53.2% 39 22.2% 499 31.8%
152 20.6% 21 11.9% 243 15.5%
12 1.6% 1 0.6% 24 1.5%
47 6.4% 17 9.7% 94 6.0%
63 8.5% 44 25.0% 255 16.3%
41 5.5% 18 10.2% 156 10.0%
13 1.8%
9 1.2%
4 2.3%
5 2.3%
5 2.8%
31 17.6%
Ii
13
8 1.1%
61 8.3%
2 0.3%
2 0.3%
27 3.7%
6.3%
7.4%
44 2.8%
85 5.4%
46 2.9%
215 13.7%
67 4.3%
82 5.2%
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Table 8
Secondary Work Activities By Grade
Activities
Management/Administratlon
of Research/Development
Management/Admlnlstratlon of
Non Research/Development
Teaching. Training, Guiding
or Counseling
Basic Research
Applied Research
Development
Report and Technical
Writing, Editing,
Information Retrieval
Design of Equipment,
Processes, Models
Quality Control,
Testing, Evaluation
Operations
Statistical Work
Computer Applications
Other Activities
Grade
GS-12 GS-15 Other
Freq % Freq % Freg %
34 5.2% 71 9.6% 20 1.4%
53 8.1% 97 13.1% 8 4.5%
48 7.4% 60 8.1% 17 9.7%
46 7.1% 43 5.8% ii 6.3%
91 14.0% 114 15.4% 19 10.8%
99 15.2% 130 17.6% 21 11.9%
124 19.0%
69 10.6%
63 8.5% 31 17.6%
34 4.6% 21 11.9%
31 4.8% 17 2.3% 7 4.0%
67 10.3% 87 11.8% 24 13.6%
14 2.1% 2 0.3% 5 2.8%
80 12.3% 31 4.2% 28 15.9%
24 3.7% 28 3.8% 5 2.8%
Total Cases
Freq %
125 9.0%
158 I0.1%
125 8.0%
i00 6.4%
224 14.3%
250 16.0%
218 13.9%
124 7.9%
55 3.5%
178 11.4%
21 1.3%
139 8.9%
57 3.6%
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Activities
Management Administration
of Research or Development
Management/Admlnistratlon of
Non Research/Development
Teaching, Training, Guiding
or Counseling
Basic Research
Applied Research
Development
Report and Technical
Writing, Editing,
Information Retrieval
Design of Equipment,
Processes, Models
Quality Control,
Testing, Evaluation
Operations
Statistical Work
Computer Applications
Other Activities
Table 9
Primary Work Activities By Center
Center
ARC LARC LERC JSC
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq
79 35.0% 64 33.3% 77 27.7% 79 33o1%
17 7.5% i0 5.2% 29 10.4% 58 24.3%
3 1.3% 3 1.6% 2 0.7% ii 4.6%
29 12.8% 21 10.9% 24 8.6% 1 0.4%
60 26.5% 61 31.8% 77 27.7% 16 6.7%
15 6.6% 16 8.3% 21 7.6% 31 13.O%
6 2.7% 7 3.6% 9 3.2% 9 3.8%
9 4.0% 13 6.8% ii 4.0% 16 6.7%
1 0.4% 2 1.0% 4 1.4% 8 3.3%
24 10.6% 8 4.2% 32 11.5% 48 i0.i_
1 0.4% 1 0.4%
8 3.5% 7 3.6% 14 5.0% 3 1.3%
5 2.2% 4 2.1% 16 5.8% 14 5.9%
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(Table 9 continued)
Primary Work Activities By Center
Activities Center
KSC MSFC GSFC SSC
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Management/Administration
of Research/Development
Management/Administration of
Non Research/Development
Teaching, Training, Guiding
or Counseling
Basic Research
Applied Research
Development
Report and Technical
Writing, Editing,
Information Retrieval
22 11.8% 66 40.5% 60 35.3% 5 23.8%
47 25.3% 21 12.9% 26 15.3% 8 38.1%
2 1.1% 1 0.6% 1 4.8%
4 2.5% 14 8.2%
5 2,7% 14 8.6% 19 11.2% 1 4.8%
13 7.0% 23 14.1% 27 15.9% 2 9.5%
5 2.7% 4 2.4% 1 4.8%
Design of Equipment,
Processes, Models
Quality Control,
Testing, Evaluation
Operations
Statistical Work
Computer Applications
Other Activities
9 4.8% 9 5.5% 13 7.6% 3 14.3%
12 6.5% 9 5.5% 5 2.9% 2 9.5%
66 35.5% 16 9.8% II 6.5% 4 19.O%
5 2.7_ 1 0.6%
8 4.3% 9 5.5% 15 8.8% 1 4.8_
17 9.1% 12 7.4% 6 3.5% 3 14.3%
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Table 10
Secondary Work Activities By Center
Activities
Management/Admlnlstration
of Research/Development
Management/Admlnlstration of
Non Research/Development
Teaching, Training, Guiding
or Counseling
Basic Research
Applied Research
Development
Report and Technical
Writing, Editing,
Information Retrieval
Design of Equipment,
Processes. Models
Quality Control,
Testing, Evaluation
Operations
Statistical Work
Computer Applications
Other Activities
Center
ARC LARC LERC JSC
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
26 11.5% 13 6.8% 20 7.2% 6 6.7%
20 8.8% 9 4.7% 19 6.8% 35 14.6_
16 7.1% 17 8.9% 28 10.1% 25 10.5%
25 11.1% 16 8.3% 29 10.4% 3 1.3%
47 20.8% 51 26.6% 47 16.9% 23 9.6%
27 11.9% 25 13.0% 29 i0.4% 53 22.2%
27 11.9% 36 18.8% 40 14.4% 34 14.2%
18 8.0% 7 3.6% 32 11.5% 15 6.3%
1 0.4% 3 1.6% i0 3.6% 4 1.7%
23 10.2% 7 3.6% 27 9.7% 33 13.8%
5 2.2% 2 1.0% 4 1.4% 2 0.8%
20 8.8% 16 8.3% 33 11.9% 19 7.9%
7 3.1% 2 1.0% 7 2.5% 12 5.0%
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(Table i0 continued)
Secondary Work Activities By Center
Activities Center
KSC MSFC GSFC
Freq % Freq % Freq
Management/Administration
of Research/Development i0 5,4% 9 5.5% 16
Management/Administration of
Non Research/Development 28 15.1% 13 8.0% 12
Teaching, Training, Guiding
or Counseling 8 4.3% 8 4.9% 17 10.0%
Basic Research 3 1.6% 7 4.3% 15 8.8%
Applied Research g 4.8% 26 16.0% 15 8.8%
Development 21 11.3% 45 27.6% 38 22.4%
Report and Technical
Writing. Editing,
Information Retrieval 22 11.8% 25 15,3% 17 10.0%
Design of Equipment,
Processes. Models 16 8.6% 12 7.4% 19 11.2%
Quality Control,
Testing, Evaluation 16 8.6% 5 3.1% 9 5,3%
Operations 36 19.4% 25 15.3% 15 8.8%
Statistical Work 2 1.1% 1 0.6% 2 1.2%
Computer Applications !5 8.1% 12 7.4% 15 8.8%
Other Activities I0 5.4% 6 3.7% 5 2.9%
%
9.4%
7.1%
SSC
Freq %
3 14.3%
3 14.3%
3 14.3%
1 4b.8%
2 9.5%
2 9.5%
4 19.0%
2 9.5%
2 9.5%
6 28.6%
3 14,3%
1 19.0%
1 4,8%
AS for secondary work activities, with the exception of
Kennedy, Stennis, and Goddard Space Flight Centers, the majority of
respondents were occupied with report and technical writing,
editing and information retrieval or development. Personnel at
Kennedy and Stennis Space Centers cited operations as a principal
secondary activity while Goddard employees cited development,
followed by design.
The next two items on the questionnaire asked respondents to
characterize the utilization of the technical competence of
scientists and engineers. Table ii presents the perceptions for
experienced scientists and engineers. Excellent and good technical
utilization of experienced personnel accounted for 61.9 percent of
the responses. The perceptions reported in Table ii include NASA
respondents from all centers.
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Table II
Utilization of Experienced Scientists and Engineers
Utilization Frequencies Percent
Excellent 240 15.4%
Good 726 46.5%
Fair 437 28.0%
Poor 127 08.1%
Very Poor 30 01.9%
Total 1,560 100.0%
Table 12 presents aggregate data on the utilization of young
scientists and engineers.
Table 12
Utilization of Young Scientists and Engineers
Utilization Frequencies Percent
Excellent 228 14.7%
Good 758 48.8%
Fair 410 26.4%
Poor 114 07.3%
Very Poor 44 02.8%
Total 1,560 100.0%
Excellent and good utilization of young scientists and engineers
accounted for 63.5 percent of the overall responses, a proportion
similar to that for experienced scientist and engineers.
Three hundred and fifty-two Grade 12 respondents and 509 Grade
15 respondents characterized the utilization of experienced
scientists and engineers as excellent or good while 323 Grade 12
respondents and 543 Grade 15 respondents shared the same perception
on young scientists and engineers. On a center by center basis,
the distributions of answers to each of the five degrees of
utilization of experienced and young engineers were also similar.
Tables 13 and 14 highlight the distributions by center.
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Center
Table 13
Utilization of Experienced
Scientists and Engineers by Center
Degrees of Utilization
Excellent Good Fai r Poor Very Poor
Ames Research Center 12.9% 49.8% 27.6% 8.9% 0.9%
Goddard Space
Flight Center 17.2% 50,9% 26,6% 4.7% 0.6%
Johnson Space
Flight Center 15.1% 49.2% 27.7% 6.3_ 1.7%
Kennedy Space
Flight Center 9.2% 39.5% 35.7_ 13.0% 2.7%
Langley Research Center 17.8% 49.2% 23.6% 7.3% 2.1%
Lewis Research Center 15.5% 44.6% 28.8% 9.4% 1.8%
Marshall Space
Flight Center 23.3% 41,1% 27.6% 7.4% 0.6%
Stennls Space Center 14 . 3% 57.1% 28.6%
Headquarters 12.5% 46.3% 23.8% 8.8% 8.8%
Table 14
Utilization of Young
Scientists and Engineers by Center
Center Degrees of UtillzatioD
Excellent Good Fair Poor Very Poor
Ames Research Center 13.3% 57.8% 22.2% 4.4% 2.2%
Goddard Space
Flight Center 18.0% 56.9% 18.6% 5.4% 1.2%
Johnson Space
Flight Center IS.1% 41.6% 30.7_ 7.6% 2.1%
Kennedy Bpace
Flight Center 7.O% 40.5% 35.7% 10.3% 6.5%
Langley Research Center 18.8% 47.1% 28.3% 4.7% 1.O%
Lewis Research Center 12.3% 53.1% 23.1% 8.3% 3.2%
Marshall Space
Flight Center 20.2% 42.9% 23.3% 11.7% 1.@%
Stennls Space Center 14.3% 42,9% 42.9%
Headquarters 6.5% 50.6% 27.3% 9.1% 6.5%
As part of characterizing their work, respondents described
the level of technical responsibility they most often exercise.
Table 15 presents overall responses to ten categories of
responsibility most often exercised by 1,540 respondents.
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Table 15
Type of Technical Responsibility
Most Frequently Exercised by Respondents
Type of Responsibility
Simple prescribed procedures
Sequence of prescribed procedures
Specific applications
Application of standard methods
Generation of alternative methods
Performance of complex tasks
Planning/organization of projects
Pioneering work
Problem solving
Systems analyses
Frequencies Percent
18 1.2%
40 2.6%
62 4.0%
i00 6.5%
62 4.0%
135 8.8%
550 35.7%
143 9.3%
277 18.0%
153 9.9%
Planning and organizing projects was, by far, the most sign-
ificant type of technical responsibility exercised by respondents
to this survey. One hundred and forty-seven (26.7 percent) of
Grade 12s responded 'planning and organization of projects" while
356 (64.7 percent) of the Grade 15s did the same. The second most
frequently selected type of responsibility by both groups was
problem solving (18 percent). The categories selected by the least
numbers of respondents of both grades were simple procedures and
sequence of prescribed procedures, followed by specific applica-
tions and generation of alternative methods.
The final question dealing with the nature of work required
yes or no response. The question was "Since joining NASA, has the
diversity (e.g., variety and complexity of work) increased at your
center?" Of the 1,537 respondents who answered this question
1,168 (76 percent) answered yes and 369 (24 percent) answered no.
The highest percentage of center respondents who answered yes were
from Stennis (85 percent) followed by Marshall (81 percent),
3O
Johnson (80 percent), Langley (73.5 percent) and Kennedy (64.7
percent).
Grade 12 employees who believed that the diversity of work
increased comprised over 37 percent of the total number of
respondents who said yes. For Grade 15 employees, almost 52
percent thought this. Almost ii percent of the employees from
other grades shared the same perception.
"Hands-On"/Contracting
The third section of the questionnaire dealt with the subjects
of contracting and "hands-on" work at centers. The first item
asked respondents to indicate duties performed by contractors at
their respective centers. The duty of representing NASA at
meetings accounted for the largest number, 915 (58.4 percent) of
the overall responses. It was followed by reviewing progress,
which captured 779 (49.7 percent) of the responses. Table 16
describes duties performed by contractors.
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Duties
Establish Policy
Commit Government Resources
Represent NASA Meetings
Define Assignments
Review Progress
Revise Work Assignments
Monitor Performance
Table 16
Duties Performed By Contractors
Cases
Frequencies Percent
160 10.2%
356 22.7%
915 58.4%
594 37.9%
779 49.7%
547 34.9%
560 35.7%
It should be noted that the individual center responses mirror
the total responses, with the exception of responses from the
Kennedy Space Center. At Kennedy, approximately two thirds of the
respondents stated that contractors define assignments, review
programs and revise assignments. Table 17 presents responses by
center.
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Duties
Establish Policy
Commit Resources
Represent NASA
at Meeting
Define Work
Assignments
Review Progress
Revise Work
Assignments
Monitor Performance
Duties
Establish Policy
Commit Resources
Represent NASA
at Meeting
Define Work
Assignments
Review Progress
Revise Work
Assignments
Monitor Performance
Duties
Establish Policy
Commit Resources
Represent NASA
at Meeting
Define Work
Assignments
Review Progress
Revise Work
Assignments
Monitor Performance
Duties
Table 17
Performed By Contractors By
ARC
Freq
16
54
Center
LARC LERC
% Freq % Freq %
7.1% 7 3.6% 20 7.2%
23.9% 24 12.5% 74 26.6%
132 58.4% 87 45.3% 192 69.1%
84 37.2% 49 25.5% 106 38.1%
104 46.0% 58 30.2% 154 55.4%
77 34.1% 36 18.8% 92 33.1%
79 35.0% 32 16.7% 121 43.5%
KSC
Freq
57 30.6%
87 46.8Z
75 40.3%
123 66.1%
128 68.8%
123 66.1%
89 47.8%
Center
HSPC
Preq %
8 4.9%
21 12.9%
84 51.5%
34 20.9%
65 39.9%
32 19.6%
46 28.2_
GSFC
Freq %
13 7.6%
23 13.5_
102 60.0%
56 32.9%
79 46.5%
50 29.4%
53 31.2%
Center
HDQS
Preq %
7 8.5%
12 14.6%
54 65.9%
18 22.0_
46 56.1%
16 19.5_
31 37.8%
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Center
JSC
Freq %
29 12.1%
55 23.0%
174 72.8%
107 44.8%
133 55.6%
106 44.4%
98 41.0%
SSC
Preq %
2 95%
4 19.0_i
13 61.9%
12 57.1%
i0 47.6%
12 57.1%
9 42.9%
The second question in this section asked: "In your opinion,
at your center, which of the following types of support provided by
contractors exceed what should be provided by the private sector?"
Respondents were asked to select one, several or no type(s) of
support services. Table 18 shows that 593 (37.8 percent) of the
respondents believed that contractor involvement in engineering and
technical services was excessive, while 519 (33.1 percent) of the
respondents did not believe that contractor involvement in any type
of support was excessive.
Table 18
Type of Support Services With
Excessive Contractors' Involvement
Types of Support Services
Engineering and
Technical Service
Research and
Development
Data Processing
Program Control
Mission Operations
Other
None
Frequencies Percent
593 37.8%
459 29.3%
145 9.3%
342 21.8%
264 16.8%
52 3.3%
519 33.1%
Responses on a center by center basis (Table 19) indicated
that 47.1 percent of the respondents from the Goddard Space Center
believe that excessive involvement by contractors in engineering
and technical services had occurred. Many respondents from the
Ames Research Center shared this perception (43.4 percent). About
42 percent of the respondents from the Marshall Space Center agreed
with the statement. Responses from other centers, with the excep-
tion of Headquarter, were in the 30 to 40 percentile. About 24
34
percent of the respondents from the Headquarters believed that
involvement was excessive in this same area.
Table 19
Excessive Contractors' Involvement By Center
Centers
ARC LARC LERC JSC KSC MSFC
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Engineering and
Technical Service 98 43.4% 69 35.9% 99 35.6% 88 36.8% 57 30.6% 69 42.3%
Research and
Development 89 39.4% 80 41.7% 88 31.7% 57 23.8% 31 16.7% 43 26.4%
Data Processing 29 12.8% 16 8.3% 19 6.8% 17 7.1% i0 5.4% 21 12.9%
Program Control 43 19.O% 19 9.9% 51 18.3% 58 24.3% 71 38.2% 34 20,9%
Mission Operations 33 14.6% 12 6.3% 23 8.3% 59 24.7% 57 30.6% 34 20,9%
Other 6 2.7% 2 1.O% II 4.0% g 3.8% 8 4.3% 4 2,5%
None 65 28.8% 68 35.4% 98 35.3% 81 33,9% 62 33.3% 46 28.2
GSFC
Freq %
Engineering and
Technical Service 80 47.1%
Research and
Development 50 29.4%
Data Processing 20 11.8%
Program Control 36 21.2%
Mission Operations 30 17.6%
Others 5 2.9%
None 48 28._!_
SSC HDQS
Freq % Freq %
7 33.3% 20 24.4%
6 28.6% ii 13.4%
1 4.8% 9 11.0%
7 33.3% 21 25.6%
4 19.0% 9 11.0%
1 4.8% 5 6,1%
7 33.3% 41 50.0%
Items three through 37 of this section dealt with "hands-on"
capability and contracting, with five-category scales with the
strongly agree - strongly disagree format. Table 20 presents the
perceptions of the efficiency of NASA vis-a-vis industry. Nearly
54 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed that the performance of
science and engineering by NASA was less efficient than by
industry.
35
Table 20
Efficiency of NASA vs. Industry
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
Strongly
Disagree
Freq %
The performance of sciences
and engineering by NASA is
less efficient than by
industry.
107 6.9% 340 21,8% 273 17.5% 519 33.3% 318 20.4%
Table 21 presents perceptions regarding the same statement by
centers.
Table 21
Efficiency of NASA vs. Industry by Center
Ames Research Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space
Flight Center 20 10.8% 46 24.9%
Marshall Space
Flight Center 9 5.5% 2S 17.2%
Goddard Space
Flight Center 5 3.0% 32 19.0%
Stennis Space Center 1 3
Headquarters 14 17.5% 15 18.8%
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
16 7.1% 47 20.9% 49 21.8% 68 30.2%
9 4.7% 38 19.9% 38 19.9% 73 38.2%
18 6.5% 62 22,3% 52 18.7% 93 33.5%
15 6.3% 68 28.6% 45 18.9% 72 30.3%
_trongly
Disagree
Freq %
45 20.0%
33 17.3%
53 19.1%
38 16.0%
24 13.0% 54 29.2% 41 22.2%
25 15.3% 62 38.0% 39 23.9%
25 ]4.9% 56 33.3_ 50 29.8_
2 9 4 21.1%
II 13.8% 27 33.8% 13 16.3%
On an aggregate basis and by center, the majority of
respondents considered NASA as or more efficient than industry,
although a fair number of respondents from all installations agreed
that industry was as or more efficient than NASA. In fact, over 30
percent of the respondents at the Johnson, Kennedy and Headquarters
installations believed that industry was as or more efficient than
NASA.
The next question asked whether NASA scientists and engineers
should perform "hands-on" work once in a while to maintain their
proficiency. Table 22 shows that 90 percent believe this to be the
case.
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Table 22
"Hands-On" Work Should Be Performed to Maintain Proficiency
Scientlsts/Englneers should
perform "hands-on work once
in a while otherwise they
will lose their proficiency.
Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
917 58.8 % 498 31.9% 82 5.3% 46 3.0% 16 1.0%
On a center by center basis, the responses are similar with
95.0 percent of the respondents from Stennis Space Center agreeing
and strongly agreeing, closely followed by 93.0 percent from
Marshall and 92.4 percent from the Ames Research Center. With the
exception of Headquarters, over 50 percent of the respondents from
centers not only agreed but they strongly agreed with the notion
that "hands-on" work should be performed to maintain proficiency.
A subsequent question, focusing on the statement that people
with direct problem solving experience get the best results
elicited the same type of responses. Table 23 reports the results
for NASA as a whole. On a center basis, answers to this question
strongly resembled the total number of responses.
Table 23
Direct Experience Tied to the Best Results
People with direct problem
solving experience get the
best results.
Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq _ Freq %
620 39.8 % 715 45.9% 167 10.7% 49 3.11 6 .4%
Whether or not it is a good idea for engineers and scientists
to specialize in a single area was the topic of the next item. In
all, 568 (36.6 percent) of the respondents disagreed that
specialization in a single area was a good idea; 453 (29.2 percent)
were neutral; 412 (26.6 percent) agreed; 60 (3.9 percent) strongly
agreed and 58 (3.7 percent) strongly disagreed.
The largest number of respondents who agreed and strongly
agreed that it is a good idea to specialize came from the Lewis
Research (40.3 percent) and Kennedy Space (39.2 percent) Centers.
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Center employees who most strongly disagreed and disagreed with
specialization, as expected, came from Headquarters, where 60.5
percent of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed
followed by the Stennis and Johnson Space Centers where
approximately 47 percent of the employees strongly disagreed and
disagreed with specialization's impact on best work.
"A top notch technical background is needed for contract
management" was the seventh statement of this section. Table 24
shows the distribution of total responses to this question, while
Table 25 shows the breakout by center.
Table 24
A Top Notch Technical Background
Is needed for Contract Management
Response Categories
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Frequencies
162
6O3
372
358
56
Percent
10.4%
38.9%
24.0%
23.1%
3.6%
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Ames Research Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space
Flight Center
Marshall Space
Flight Center
Goddard Space
Flight Center
Stennis Space Center
Headquarters
Table 25
A Top Notch Technical Background
Is needed for Contract Management
Strongly Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
31 13.8% 81 38.2% 49 21.9% 53 23.7% i0 4.5%
21 11.1% 83 43.9% 38 20.1% 40 21.2% 7 3.7%
35 12.6% 124 44.8% 52 18.8% 56 20.2% i0 3.6%
25 10.5% 85 35.7% 61 25.6% 61 25.6% 6 2.5%
Ii 6.0% 59 32.1% 59 32,1% 4g 26,6% 6 3,3%
12 7.5% 55 34.4% 44 27.5% 45 28.1% 4 2.5%
20 11.9% 75 44.6% 47 28,0% 20 11,9% 6 3.6%
1 4.8% 7 33.3% 5 23.8% 7 33.3% 1 4.8%
3 3,8% 29 36,3% 17 21.3% 25 31,3% 6 7,5%
"NASA provides challenging work assignments" was the next
strongly agree - strongly disagree item. One thousand two hundred
and fifty-two (80.5 percent) of the total number of survey
respondents strongly agreed and agreed, 193 respondents (12.4
percent) indicated that they were neutral, and only ii0 respondents
(7 percent) disagreed and strongly disagreed. The distribution of
responses on a center basis were very similar.
"Most productive researchers do not want to manage contractor
efforts" was the next measure of "hands-on" work. A total of 1,062
(68.5 percent) people agreed and strongly agreed, 336 (21.7
percent) were neutral and 153 (9.9 percent) disagreed and strongly
disagreed. As for center respondents, 81.3 percent of Ames
employees agreed or strongly agreed followed by 73.3 percent of
Marshall employees. The lowest percentage of people agreeing and
strongly agreeing came from Headquarters, 53.1 percent.
The next statement was, "Contract management, within the
context of NASA, requires more technical capabilities than
administrative skills." Seven hundred and four respondents (45.5
percent) agreed and strongly agreed, 397 (25.6 percent) were
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neutral and 44.7 (28.9 percent) disagreed and strongly disagreed
with this statement. Percentages who agreed and strongly agreed,
by center, are:
Langley Research Center
Headquarters
Marshall Space Center
Ames Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
50.0 percent
53.1 percent
53.9 percent
44.3 percent
40.8 percent
44.5 percent
41.0 percent
Goddard Space Flight Center 44.9 percent
Stennis Space Center 38.1 percent
Item ii probed whether or not a great deal of challenging
aeronautics and space work is performed by contractors, not NASA.
One thousand one hundred and sixty-five NASA scientists and
engineers (74.9 percent) agreed and strongly agreed; 223 (15
percent) responded neutrally; and 158 (i0.i percent) disagreed and
strongly disagreed. Between 70 and 80 percent of the respondents
at all centers agreed and strongly agreed. Positive responses
ranged from 83.2 percent at Kennedy to 71.0 percent at Langley.
Just over 63 percent of the respondents said systems analysis
capabilities and integrative skills are highly valued in NASA.
Twenty-three percent answered neutral, and 13 percent disagreed and
strongly disagreed. The distribution of responses by center
closely resembled the distribution of NASA responses as a whole,
although the Stennis employees (76.2 percent) and the Marshall
employees (75.8 percent) agreed most strongly.
The trend toward expanding use of contractors has shifted
challenging tasks from NASA to contractors, 1,256 (80.9 percent) of
NASA employees agree and strongly agree. One hundred and seventy-
eight respondents (11.5 percent) checked neutral and only 119 (7.V
percent) disagreed or strongly disagreed. At Kennedy, 88.1 percen_
answered agree and strongly agree and at Goddard 83.3 percent did
so. At all of the other centers, agree and strongly agree
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categories had over 75 but less than 80 percent of the respondents'
votes.
Over 68 percent of the respondents said that the distinction
between contractors and civil servants is blurred at NASA sites.
Only 20.1 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed while 11.7
percent indicated neutrality. On a center basis the Langley
Research Center perceives the most blurring (81 percent). At
Kennedy, 39 percent of the people agreed and strongly agreed with
the blurring of workforces. At the majority of other centers,
approximately 60 to 70 percent of the respondents thought this.
A strong 83 percent of agreed and strongly agreed that hands-
on experience is required to properly manage and evaluate contrac-
tors' efforts. Only 6.7 percent of the respondents disagreed and
strongly disagreed while 9.5 percent were neutral. Respondents
from all centers answered agree and strongly agree above the 70
percent mark.
When asked to comment on, "NASA should hire more scientists
and engineers with privates sector experience," 973 (56 percent) of
the respondents answered agree and strongly agree. Only 7.4
percent checked disagree and strongly disagree; however, 36.6
percent of the respondents were neutral. The Stennis respondents
agreed and strongly agreed at 66.4 percent, followed by Johnson at
59.7 percent. About 50 to 55 percent of all other center
respondents agreed and strongly agreed.
Nine hundred and ten (58.5 percent) of the respondents said
that they agree and strongly agree that the future roles of
contractors should be limited. Four hundred and twenty-five people
(27.3 percent) were neutral and 220 (14 percent) disagreed and
strongly disagreed. On a center basis, the three centers who most
strongly believed that contractors roles should be limited were the
Kennedy, Marshall and Goddard Space Flight Centers with respective
percentages of 68.7, 63.0, and 61.9 percent. Johnson had the
greatest number of respondents who voiced negative opinions on
limiting the future roles of contractors.
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"Contractors have assumed many roles that are governmental,"
56.6 percent of NASA scientists and engineers agreed and strongly
agreed. However, 27 percent checked neutral and 16.5 percent
disagreed or strongly disagreed. Over 65 percent of the Stennis
and Headquarters employees agreed and strongly agreed while 19.1
percent of those at Marshall did so making Marshall the chief
objector to the statement.
A little less than half of NASA respondents agreed and
strongly agreed that NASA program managers spend too much of their
time exercising oversight responsibilities. Slightly over thirty
30 percent were neutral and approximately 18 percent disagreed and
strongly disagreed. The Ames and Kennedy employees ranked the
highest in terms of agree and strongly agree, at about 55 percent.
The majority of center respondents answered positively around 50
percent of the time. Headquarters respondents had the lowest
percentage of agrees and strongly agrees at 40.7. It should,
however, be noted that 40.7 percent on a five point scale is
considered vigorous.
A statement which read, "NASA has in-house competence to make
responsible decisions in all programs for which it is responsible,"
elicited a reply of 49.2 percent in the agree and strongly agree
categories. Exactly 17 percent of those who answered this question
were neutral, while 34 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed.
The individual center responses with the highest rates of agreement
were Kennedy (65.4 percent) and Marshall (61.1 percent). The
center that disagreed and strongly disagreed the most was Ames
(47.6 percent), followed by Goddard and Stennis respondents with
about 38 percent.
Only 22.5 percent of all respondents agreed and strongly
agreed that NASA in-house scientific and engineering capabilities
are as strong as during the past. Just over 57 percent disagreed
and strongly disagreed and 20.4 percent of the respondents were
neutral.
The center respondents who most disagreed were from Lewis
(67.2 percent), followed by Ames (66.8 percent) and Goddard (61.1
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percent). The two centers that disagreed the least were Stennis
(33.3 percent) and Kennedy (49.7 percent).
Regarding management and the perception of whether management
is as strong as in the past, 48.8 percent of the respondents
disagreed and 21.6 percent agreed that it was as strong as during
the past. Almost 30 percent were neutral. By center, the
percentage of disagrees generally were the highest at Ames and
Headquarters (a little over 50 percent).
About 40 percent of all respondents agreed and strongly agreed
that NASA program managers have the right mix of technical and
administrative skills to successfully complete jobs. About 35
percent of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed. Over
28 percent were neutral. Ames respondents most frequently
disagreed with the current skill mix (46 percent). The most
favorable reaction to skill mix came from Marshall respondents (53
percent).
The next statement was, "A large number of scientists and
engineers in NASA are malutilized (e.g., unreasonable time demands
on the job)." Over 52 percent of the respondents agreed and
strongly agreed, 21 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed and
26.5 percent were neutral. On a center basis, Johnson employees
had the highest percentage of agree and strongly agree (59.3
percent) followed by Goddard (55.1 percent). The disagree grouping
ranged from 29 percent at Kennedy 14.3 percent at Stennis.
A similar phrase concerning underutilization was stated.
Seven hundred forty-four (48 percent) of the respondents agreed and
strongly agreed that underutilization of scientists and engineers
occurs, 20.7 percent were neutral and 31.2 percent disagreed and
strongly disagreed. Light technical demands were cited as a form
of underutilization. Highest percentages of underutilization were
reported by Kennedy (62.0 percent) and Marshall employees (57.4
percent). About 43 percent of the Ames Research Center employees
disagreed and strongly disagreed that underutilization occurs,
while 38 percent of Ames Employees agreed and strongly agreed. The
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lowest percent-age of disagreement occurred at the Kennedy Space
Center (14 percent).
A strong plurality of respondents (65.7 percent) said the
public interest would be best served if less technical work were
contracted out to the private sector, 21.6 percent of them were
neutral and 12.6 percent of the respondents did not concur.
Goddard employees most agreed and most strongly agreed (72.8
percent) followed by Stennis (71.4 percent). Except for
Headquarters' personnel, who had a 52.5 percent rate of agreement,
other centers generally agreed at rates in the range of 65 to 70
percent.
Only 342 (22 percent) members of the scientific and
engineering professional categories believed that the private
sector provides a climate for greater creativity and productivity
of scientists and engineers than the public sector. Three hundred
and thirty-eight (21.8 percent) of the respondents were neutral and
873 (55.7 percent) of the respondents disagreed and strongly
disagreed. The highest disagreement rate was from the Langley
Research Center (71.4 percent). The highest agreement rate can be
traced to the Kennedy Space Center (36.1 percent).
The majority of people who responded to the statement: "NASA
does a good job of identifying, developing and assigning people
capable of playing key roles in the technical direction of
projects," agreed and strongly agreed (43.9 percent). About 27
percent were neutral and about 29 percent disagreed and strongly
disagreed. By center, the largest amount of employees who agreed
and strongly agreed came from Marshall (49.0 percent) followed by
Goddard (47.6 percent). The largest number of responses in the
disagree and strongly disagree classifications was from
Headquarters (47.5 percent) followed by Lewis (36.2 percent).
A very high number (1,289) of Grade 12 and 15 scientists and
engineers, (83.2 percent) agreed and strongly agreed that NASA
needs to expand or initiate more in-house projects to provide for
hands-on experience. Only 11.9 percent of respondents checked
neutral and 5 percent checked disagree and strongly disagree. All
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of the centers, with the exception of Headquarters, agreed and
strongly agreed in the 70 to 90 percent range. At Headquarters
67.6 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed.
The rate of agreement among respondents was high with regard
to the statement, "Too much of scientific and engineering efforts
in NASA is spent in preparing and selling programs." One thousand
and one hundred and forty (73.5 percent) agreed and strongly
agreed. About 18 percent were neutral and about 8 percent
disagreed and strongly disagreed. In the strongly disagree
category, there were only 6 responses and in the disagree category
71 responses. On a center basis, the greatest number of agree and
strongly agree marks came from the Stennis (85.7 percent), followed
by the Ames (84.3 percent).
The rate of consensus dropped with the following statement,
"When people leave NASA, they rarely leave because the work does not
have enough "hand-on" characteristics (e.g. development and
fabrication of prototypes, testing, production)." About 26 percent
of the respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed, about 34
percent were neutral (the largest single category of responses to
this question), and 6.1 percent agreed while 33.7 percent strongly
agreed adding up to an agreement rate of nearly 40 percent. The
highest agree and strongly agree rate was at the Langley Research
Center (54.5 percent). The highest disagree and strongly disagree
rate was at Kennedy (55.9 percent).
The following statement regards support personnel. "Greater
numbers of personnel working in support of NASA scientists and
engineers (technicians, model makers and other skilled workers and
production workers) should be civil servants." Of the total
responses to this question, 57.9 percent of the scientists and
engineers agreed and strongly agreed, 25.9 percent was neutral and
15.1 percent disagree and strongly disagree. Goddard and Langley
led the agree and strongly agree categories (approximately 65
percent). The highest disagreement rate was from Stennis (38.1
percent). However, only eight employees constituted this 38.1
percent figure.
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Five hundred and eighty-two (34.0 percent) of those who filled
in surveys agreed and strongly agreed that many important
management decisions are being made by contractors, not civil
servants; 30.6 percent of the respondents answered neutral and 35.5
percent disagreed and strongly disagreed with the statement. By
center the highest composite agreement rate was at Kennedy (59.1
percent) and the lowest rate was Langley (20.4 percent). The
highest composite disagree rate occurred at the Marshall Space
Flight Center (40.4 percent).
The need for stronger program control was endorsed by 54.1
percent of the respondents who agreed and strongly agreed to such
an item. About 36 percent of the respondents voted neutral and a
little over i0 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed. The
strongest endorsement of the need for more program control came
from Stennis (80.9 percent) followed by the Kennedy, Marshall,
Johnson and Lewis Centers, in respective order. The highest
composite disagreement rate came from the Ames Research Center
(81.1 percent). When the statement, "Few individuals in NASA
possess skills involving the artful blending of technology and
administration" was posed, 44.6 percent of the respondents were in
accord, 20.3 percent indicated neutral and 35.1 percent disagreed
and strongly disagreed. Distribution of individual center
responses closely paralleled the overall distribution of responses.
About 29 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed
that modern tools, such as computer assisted design, do not provide
scientists and engineers with an intuitive feel for hardware.
Approximately 32 percent of the responses to this scaled item
reflected neutrality and about 39 percent of the respondents
disagreed and strongly disagreed. At Stennis 66.6 percent of the
respondents disagreed and strongly disagreed; all of the other
centers were in the 30 to 40 percent range. The strongest
composite agreements came from the Lewis and Langley Research
Centers which were followed closely by the Marshall Space Flight
Center and Ames Research Center. All had agreement rates in the 30
- 40 percent range.
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The final statement in this section of the questionnaire was,
"Engineers should be able to acquire "cradle to grave" experience
on projects." The composite agreement rate was 71.1 percent, the
composite neutral rate was 17.7 and the composite disagreement rate
was 8.2 percent. Lewis employees had the strongest disagreement
rate (13.2 percent). This compares to Lewis' agreement rate of
65.3 percent. The strongest agreement rate occurred at Goddard
(86.3 percent). Goddard's disagree figure was 2.4 percent.
Image of the Public Service
Section IV of the questionnaire was comprised of 15 strongly
agree - strongly disagree items that dealt with public service
image.
The first item was, "I would recommend NASA as an employer."
Slightly over 76 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly
agreed, about 13 percent were neutral and about i0 percent
disagreed and strongly disagreed. Center distributions to this
statement closely approximated the total number of NASA responses.
One thousand three hundred and twelve respondents (84.0
percent) believed they were doing important work as NASA employees;
155 (9.9 percent) checked the neutral classification; and 94 (6.0
percent) did not feel they were doing important work. The
respondents with the lowest rate of agreement were from the Kennedy
Space Center and Headquarters (77.3 and 78.8 percent respectively).
About 40 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed
that government service is a place to gain experience for a better
job. About 34 percent replied neutral and 24 percent disagreed and
strongly disagreed. The agreement rates were in the fiftieth and
upper fortieth percentiles at Stennis, Goddard and Ames
installations. Highest rates of disagreement were at Kennedy,
Headquarters and Marshall, with rates of 25 to 30 percent.
There was a perception that there is more red tape in the
government sector than the non-government sector. About 68 percent
of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed. The strongest rates
of agreement were from Kennedy (72.4 percent) and Langley (70.7
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percent). The strongest disagreement rate was at Stennis (19
percent) followed by Johnson (13.8).
Four hundred and seventy-six (30.6 percent) of the respondents
agreed and strongly agreed that government research and development
is less efficient than the private sector. Almost 28 percent were
neutral and close to 41 percent replied disagree and strongly
disagree. On a center basis, the highest rates of disagreement
were at Marshall and at Langley. The lowest rate of disagree and
strongly disagree occurred at Johnson. The highest composite
agreement rates that the government research and development is
less efficient than the private sector were at Headquarters (35.8
percent) and at the Johnson Space Center (37.8 percent).
In reply to the statement, "Most science and engineering
students would prefer working in the private sector," 40.3 percent
of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed, 32.6 percent said
neutral and 27.1 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed. The
responses of the centers mirrored the total distribution with the
exception of the Stennis Space Center where 13 (61.9 percent) of
the respondents agreed.
Thirteen hundred forty-seven (86.3 percent) of the scientists
and engineers agreed and strongly agreed that government scientists
and engineers are as important as their counterparts in the private
sector. About 9 percent of the respondents were neutral and the
remainder of those surveyed disagreed and strongly disagreed. The
distribution of responses by center was very close to the overall
distribution.
A related statement asserted that government scientists and
engineers are, on the whole, as capable as scientists and engineers
in other sectors. A preponderance, 1,320 (85.1 percent) agreed and
strongly agreed, 8.8 percent said they were neutral and 6.1 percent
disagreed and strongly disagreed. The three centers that had the
greatest numbers of agrees and strongly agrees were Stennis (95.2
percent), Lewis (90.7 percent), and Marshall (90.2 percent). The
center that had the largest proportion of disagree and strongly
disagree was Kennedy (9.7 percent).
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The statement, "The best scientists and engineers leave the
government for other jobs" elicited the strongest response from
those who replied neutral (over 30 percent) when each of the five
response categories were considered independently. The combination
of the agree and the strongly agree categories captured 35.9
percent of the vote and the disagree and the strongly disagree
categories garnered 33.0 percent of the vote.
The assertion that, "Government workers are as carefully
selected and recruited as private sector workers," solicited an
aggregate agree and strongly agree response rate of 46.7 percent.
About 20 percent of the respondents were impartial and the others
disagreed. The highest rate of discord was at Kennedy (37.6
percent). The highest rate of accord was at Goddard (54.4
percent).
In response to the declaration that, "The government attracts
freshouts as capable as the freshouts that the private sector
attracts", 41.5 percent of the total feedback was in the agree and
strongly agree groupings; 17 percent was in the neutral grouping;
and 41.5 percent was in the disagree and strongly disagree
groupings. The Kennedy respondents agreed the most (51.9 percent).
The Headquarters' respondents most disagreed and strongly disagreed
(60 percent).
About 55 percent of the respondents observed that the good
points of working for the government outweigh the bad points, 30
percent were neutral and about 14 percent disagreed and strongly
disagreed. Those who coincided most with the positively phrased
statement were from Stennis (85.7 percent), followed by Johnson
(67.8 percent). Those who were most at variance with the statement
were from Headquarters 24.4 percent and at Ames (27.8 percent).
About 30 percent of the respondents had no opinion, although the
range of responses in the neutral category by center included a
high of 38.7 percent at Ames and a low of 14.3 percent at Stennis.
The statement, "Scientists and engineers working for the
government have good chances to get ahead," elicited a concurring
response of 51.3 percent, a neutral response of 25.6 percent and a
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divergent response of 13.1 percent. The strongest agreement came
from Stennis employees (71.4 percent) followed by Goddard (57.1
percent). The strongest disagreement came from Langley employees
(29.5 percent) followed by Headquarters (23.7 percent).
Reactions to a statement that government employees have as
much of a chance to develop as private sector counterparts earned
a 58.3 positive response rate, a 20.0 percent neutral response
rate, and a 21.7 percent negative response rate. Center responses
were about the same as overall responses, although the lowest agree
and strongly agree rate was from Headquarters (44.4 percent).
The last assertion was, "Considering political, economic and
social trends, the government as an employer rates higher than
other sectors." Table 26 shows the responses across the five
categories ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
Table 26
The Government, as an Employer,
Rates Higher than Other Sectors
Responses Categories Frequencies Percent
Strongly Agree 36 2.3%
Agree 322 20.6%
Neutral 535 34.3%
Disagree 519 33.3%
Strongly Disagree 148 9.5%
On a center by center basis, the least favorable response to
rating the government higher than other employers came from Ames
employees (53.0 percent), followed by Headquarters' employees (48.4
percent). The largest number of employees who agreed and strongly
agreed with the statement came from the Johnson Space Center (29.3
percent). However, the neutral category was selected most often.
Recruitment/Retention
The fifth section of the questionnaire pertained to
recruitment and retention. It consisted of two items with lists
of six measures spelling out response options and ten scaled items
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placed on five point scales, consisting of strongly agree to
strongly disagree.
The first item asked respondents to indicate how many years it
will take before they are eligible for retirement. Table 27 pre-
sents the findings for all respondents.
Table 27
Number of Years Before Retirement Eligibility
Years
Currently eligible
Under 5 years
5 to 7 years
8 to I0 years
i0 to 15 years
16 or more years
Frequencies Percent
199 12.9%
297 19.2%
II0 7.1%
94 6.1%
134 8.7%
713 46.1%
The largest number of respondents, 713 (46.1 percent) will
only be eligible for retirement in 16 or more years, followed by
496 (32.1 percent) respondents who are currently eligible or will
be eligible in less than 5 years.
By center, please note that the Stennis Space Center and the
Kennedy Space Center will have over 60 percent of their employees
eligible for retirement in 16 years or more while the Lewis Space
Center and the Marshall Space Center currently have the largest
percentages of people eligible for retirement (about 17 percent).
Table 28 presents retirement eligibility data by center.
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Ames Research Center
Langley Research Center
LewEs Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space
Flight Center
Marshall Space
Flight Center
Goddard Space
Flight Center
Stennis Space Center
Headquarters
Table 28
Years to Retirement by Center
NOW Under 5 5 TO 7 8 TO i0
El _ g _bl e Years Years Years
Freq , Freq % Freq _ Freq %
25 !1.2_ 35 15.6% 25 Ii.2_ 8
24 12.6% 34 17.9% 16 8.4% 13
48 17 .4% 50 18.1% 20 7 . 2% 19
23 9.7% 43 18,1% 18 7.6% 16
i0 To i5 16 OR More
Years Years
Fleq _ Freq %
3.6% 31 13.8_ i00 44.6%
6.8% 17 8.9% 86 45.3%
6.9% 16 5.8% 123 44.6%
6.8% 17 7,2% 120 50.6%
13 7.1% 33 17.9% 6
27 16.7% 34 21.0% 5 3.1% 7 4.3% 9 5.6% 80 49.4%
25 15.2% 33 20.0% I0 6.1% 8 4,8% 16 9.7_ 73 44.2%
5 23.8 1 4.8 2 9.5% 13 6].9%
13 16.O% 27 33.3% 8 9.9% 12 14.8% 14 17.3% 7 3.6%
3.3_ i0 5.4% ii 6.0 iii 60.3%
The second item was: "How long do you plan to work at NASA".
Table 29 presents aggregate responses across centers:
Table 29
Number of Years Planning to Work at NASA
Years Frequencies Percent
Under 5 years 310 20.1%
5 to 7 years 188 12.2%
8 to i0 years 128 8.3%
I0 to 15 years 133 8.6%
16 or more years 301 19.5%
Undecided 485 31.4%
The bulk of respondents, 485 (31.4 percent) were undecided
although 310 (20.1 percent) said they plan to work at NASA for less
than five years.
By center, the largest number of people who were undecided
about the number of years they plan to work at NASA were from the
Lewis Space Center, 83 (30.3 percent) respondents. However, 70
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respondents (42.2 percent) of Goddard and 74 respondents (31.1
percent) at Johnson also indicated indecisiveness. Sixty (21.9
percent) respondents from Lewis noted that they plan to leave in
the next five years or less. Table 30 shows the years employees
plan to work for NASA by center.
Table 30
Years Planning to Work For NASA by Center
Ames Research Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space
Flight Center
Marshall Space
Flight Center
Goddard Space
Flight Center
Stennis Space Center
Headquarters
Under 5
Years Years Years Years Years
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
52 23.3% 36 16.1% 18 8.1% 21 9.4% 30 13.5%
35 18,4% 25 13.2% 22 ii.6% 15 7,9% 39 20,5%
60 21.9% 31 11.3% 18 6.6% 29 10.6% 53 19.3%
40 16.8% 30 12.6% 18 7.6% 20 8.4% 56 23.5%
5 TO 7 8 TO i0 i0 TO 15 16 OR More Undecided
Freq %
66 29.6%
54 28,4%
83 30.3%
74 31.1%
37 20.1% 17 9.2% 16 8.7% 12 6.5% 38 20.7% 64 34.8%
24 15.O% 18 11.3% 9 5.6% ii 6.9% 46 28.8% 52 32.5%
32 19_3% 18 10.8% 13 7.8% ii 6.6% 22 13.3%
2 9.5% 2 9.5% 2 9.5% 8 38.1%
26 31.7% 9 11.O% 12 14.6% 12 14.6% g 11.3%
70 42.2%
7 33.3%
14 17.1%
The first scaled item on this section of the questionnaire
was: "My progress at NASA has been satisfactory." One thousand and
one hundred and sixty-five (74.9 percent) of the respondents agreed
and strongly agreed, 147 (9..5 percent) were neutral and 244 (15.6
percent) disagreed demonstrating a high degree of satisfaction with
career progress. By center, the responses closely echoed the
aggregate responses although the composite rate of disagreement at
Lewis was slightly higher than at other centers, 22 percent,
followed by about 19 percent at Stennis. The other centers
averaged about a 14 percent rate of disagreement, comprised of
disagree and strongly disagree choices.
When asked to react to the statement, "My job fits in well
with my future goals", 72 percent of the respondents agreed and
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strongly agreed, 17 percent were neutral and ii percent disagreed
and strongly disagreed. The distributions of responses by center
were very similar to the distribution of total responses.
"I regard working for NASA as my lifetime career" was a
statement to which 64.4 percent of the respondents agreed and
strongly agreed, 20.5 percent was neutral, and 15.2 percent
disagreed and strongly disagreed. Headquarters' and Lewis'
employees most strongly regarded NASA as the place of their
lifelong careers. Ames' employees were most inclined to disagree
(21.0 percent).
The quality of current hires in science and engineering was
perceived to be as good as ever by 49.5 percent of the respondents
who agreed and strongly agreed. About 27 percent replied neutral
and about 23 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed. The dis-
agreement rate was highest at the Ames Research Center (36.0
percent) and lowest at the Johnson Space Center (15.9 percent).
Agreement rates were high at Goddard, Marshall, Langley and Kennedy
installations where over 50 percent of the respondents expressed
agreement, and lowest at Headquarter where 37 percent of the
respondents agreed.
About 33 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed
that they feel less satisfied with their work now than in the past,
17 percent were neutral, and 50 percent disagreed and strongly
disagreed that they are less satisfied now than in the past. By
center, employees from Ames and Kennedy agreed and strongly agreed
the most with the observation that they are currently less
satisfied with their work. Disagreement ran the highest at the
Stennis, Marshall and Johnson Centers where over 50 percent of the
employees disagreed and strongly disagreed.
"I would quit if I found another job in the same line of work
with comparable benefits" captured only 12.2 percent of the agrees
and strongly agrees, indicating high commitment. About 20 percent
of the respondents were neutral and 68 percent of the respondents
disagreed and strongly disagreed. Disagreement indices at
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Headquarters and the Marshall Space Flight Center lagged by about
i0 to 15 percent behind indices of other centers.
Almost 50 percent of the respondents agreed that they are not
eager to change jobs but would change Jobs if they could get a
better job. About 23 percent were neutral and 28 percent
disagreed. The highest number of agrees and strongly agrees came
from Stennis, Johnson and Headquarters respondents while the
highest number of disagrees and strongly disagrees came from the
Marshall, Goddard and Lewis respondents.
When the statement, "Scientists and engineers at NASA need to
perform more "hands-on" work" appeared, 80.7 percent of the
respondents agreed and strongly agreed, 14.4 percent were neutral
and 4.8 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed. The array of
responses by center was similar to the responses across centers.
About 54 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed
that the majority of scientists and engineers with whom they work
will retire as soon as they are eligible, about 25 percent were
neutral, and about 21 percent disagreed and strongly disagreed.
Responses by center, which vary slightly from the distribution of
total responses, are presented in Table 31.
Ames Research Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space
Flight Center
Marshall Space
Flight Center
Goddard Space
Flight Center
Stennis Space Center
Headquarters
Table 31
The Majority of S&ES Will Retire
As Soon As They Are Eligible
Strongly
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
33 14.7% 92 40.9% 59 26.2% 39 17.3%
23 12.1% 87 45.8% 36 18.9% 42 22.1%
29 10.5% 97 35.1% 67 24.3% 77 27.9%
35 14.7% ii0 46.2% 52 21.8% 38 16.0%
Strongly
Disagree
Freq %
2 .9%
2 1.1%
6 2.2%
3 1.3%
35 18.9% 74 40.0% 47 25.4% 29 15.7%
15 9.2% 57 35.0% 48 29.4% 39 23.9% 4 2.5%
21 12.6% 59 35.3% 45 26.9% 36 21.6%
2 9.5% 4 19.O% 9 42.9% 6 28.6%
16 19.8% 33 40.7% 20 24.7% 12 14.8%
6 3.6%
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The final agree - disagree item of the questionnaire said:
"Most NASA scientists and engineers often talk of changing jobs."
Exactly 24.8 percent of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed,
25 percent responded neutral and 50.2 percent disagreed and
strongly disagreed. At Headquarters, 35.8 percent of the
respondents agreed and strongly agreed, followed by the respondents
at the Kennedy Space Center (32.9 percent) and the respondents at
the Ames Research Center (31.6 percent). The disagree and
strongly disagree categories were most strongly represented by
Lewis employees (57.7 percent) followed by Langley employees (56.5
percent).
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APPENDIX A
PART III
NARRATIVE COMMENTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Introduction
The narrative section of the questionnaire was at the end of
the written survey administered to 2,243 grades 12 and 15
Scientists and Engineers. The total number of responses were 1,615
(72 percent). Of these respondents, 752 provided written comments
on a range of topics. Table 1 reports response rates to the
narrative part of the questionnaire by grade level and NASA
installations.
Narrative Comments:
of Narrative Responses
by Installations and Grade Level
Center
Ames Research Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Marshall Space Flight Center
Goddard Space Flight Center
Stennis Space Center
Headquarters
Unidentified by Center
Table 1
Frequencies and Percentages
Frequencies
133
78
134
125
85
67
74
ii
99
6
Percent
17 7
i0 4
17 8
16 6
ii 3
89
98
1 5
5 2
8
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Grade Level Frequencies Percent
Grade 12 312 41.5
Grade 15 352 46.8
Other Grades (GS 13, 14, SES, et.) 87 11.6
Unidentified 1
Total 752 i00.0
Table 2 reports the ages of those who responded to the
narrative section of the questionnaire. The largest number were in
the 51 - 60 age group while the smallest number were in the 61 or
above age group. This corresponds to the approximate age
distribution of NASA scientists and engineers.
Table 2
Narrative Comments: Frequencies and Percentages by Age
Age Group Frequencies Percent
30 or Under 190 25.3
31 - 40 151 20.1
41 - 50 163 21.7
51 - 60 202 26.8
61 or Above 36 4.8
Unidentified i0 1.3
Total 742 i00.0
Methodology
The narrative section consisted of the last page of
questionnai:_e with the following phrase, "Do you wish to comment on
this questionnaire or add any observations concerning any of the
topics which this questionnaire emphasized?" Comments dealt with
working environments, management processes, the mission and goals
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of NASA as a whole as well as individual centers, the relationship
between contractors and government personnel, inherently
governmental functions, :ecruitment and retention of personnel,
survey methods and a host of other topics such as advocacy of
programs and the amount of _aper work. We divided these comments
into 56 topical categories. They were then streamlined and
regrouped into iJ subject categories.
Site order matrices, based on the location of nine NASA
installations, were developed as a first step in analyzing comments
from different centers. Comments on specific matters were
attributed to many informants, several informants, a few
informants, or one informant at each site. Many respondents typed
one to four pages on a variety of topics. The vast majority of
comments were reflective; they were written at a more inferential
or analytical level than usual narrative data and were often
accompanied by a logical chain of factors or explanations that
provided a basis for explaining observations or experiences.
A review of survey literature reveals that the range of
respondents< who generally provide narrative comments on written
questionnaires include a broad spectrum of people ranging from
reflective and constructive people to dissatisfied members of the
work force to employees with emotional problems that range from
mild distress to acute psychiatric problems. Even so, informants
will typically craft their responses to be amenable to researchers
and to protect their self-interests, resulting in bias. In a few
cases, the researchers were viewed as seeking information that
would likely result in little or no change or as contractors
contributing to the problem of deterioration of in-house
capability.
Response bias related to narrative comments is a concern for
three reasons. First, because 752 of 1,567 respondents furnished
written comments, the response rate is not statistically as
representative as the response rate to the closed questions and
Likert scale statements on the questionnaire. It is likely that
the sample of 752 scientists and engineers is not perfectly
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representative of the larger population of scientists and engineers
at NASA. Second, there is not only the broader social scientific
one of generalizations, but, also one of class bias. Although
scientists and engineers are the group of informants most directly
involved in the focus of this study, and are, as previously noted,
knowledgeable and close to the processes with which the researchers
are concerned, weight given to their comments should be tempered by
managers' judgments, contractors' opinions, and other sources'
views. Third, the external validity of the narrative data may have
been influenced by previous sections of the survey instrument and
recent events, including the Advisory Committee currently engaged
in a review of NASA policies and practices. Thus, the researchers
assign a weight of lesser relative importance to the narrative data
than to information obtained from the closed questions and scaled
items of the mailed questionnaire.
Findings
Findings are presented in 12 categories across all sites. The
last category contained a number of matters that merit considera-
tion, but that diverged from the rest of this study. If one or
more of the particular centers contributed, on purely statistical
grounds, more strongly to a given subject, a particular center(s)
is cited. If there were notable variations among centers,
variations are described although no attempts are made to comment
on the implications or reasons for the variations. To discover the
significance and causes of site variations we would have to analyze
the dynamics of the individual centers.
Contracting
The vast majority of respondents at all sites commented on
contracting. The greatest number of comments stressed that
contracting has led to a demise in the in-house capacity to run
programs, adequately control contracts, participate in the decision
making process, evaluate the results of contractors' work and be
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directly accountable to the public. The following remarks focused
on the negative effects of support service contracting:
I am personally convinced that the recent failures NASA
has had were caused by the lack of in-house, hands-on
experience caused by contracting. Excessive contracting
has reduced in-house expertise.
The technical competence within NASA has been allowed to
erode (due to private sector involvement in space
projects); this condition must be corrected if we are to
achieve a viable program of space exploration.
The relationship between NASA and its contractors has
evolved into an unproductive environment.
NASA needs to accept responsibility of poor contractor
performance by recognizing that (i) the contractor has
his own interests in mind and (2) NASA does not always
know how to manage the contractor to ensure NASA's
interests come first.
As we contract for more and more work, the expertise will
belong more and more to the contractor. The NASA civil
servant will become, more and more, a contract
administrator.
The ratio of contractor employees to NASA employees is
too high.
A number of respondents pointed out that in many cases,
contractors perform more interesting tasks than civil servants.
For example, one employee stated: "The vast number of "good jobs"
are contractor positions." Another stated that the "more
challenging assignments are given to contractors."
Several respondents, mainly from research centers, were
critical of contractor support service personnel background and
training for assignments while others noted that contractors often
"fill spots with paper credentials rather than with real
accomplishments." Others, however, noted that contractors are
competent and dedicated. At the three research centers, the
capability of contractors was more often questioned than at the
space flight centers. Respondents from all centers noted that
NASA's ability to be a "smart buyer" and to make independent
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judgments about the quality of the work has declined as the number
of contractors has grown. NASA, has lost its real experience base
and will continue to slide unless the current trend to contract is
reversed.
Employees from several centers noted that contracting resulted
in not only the deterioration of hands-on experience but also the
loss of institutional memory within NASA. Several said that there
appears to be an absence of a foundation upon which to base certain
decisions and contended that an agency-based knowledge helps
establish strong professional identities. Although individuals may
develop specialized knowledge through reading and research, "know-
how" is generally acquired through considerable hands-on
experience.
A few people mentioned that in terms of continuity, contractor
personnel were fairly unstable, and a few others pointed out that
contractors have worked for the agency for decades and are
virtually indistinguishable from civil servants.
Many employees mentioned that the use of contractors is
closely tied to special interests and that contracting has emerged
as a form of pork barrel politics. "Contracts have," an employee
noted, "become forms of local political patronage."
A few employees noted the lack of competition among contrac-
tors and difficulties associated with procurement. "The escalation
in the amount of red tape associated with procurement is an attempt
to make a process rational that is not very rational after all," an
engineer wrote. A few pointed out that a great deal of time and
energy is wasted during the procurement process.
A few respondents from the Lewis Space Center mentioned that
senior managers always perceive contractors as correct and tend to
ignore in-house staff. There was a general feeling(expressed by
several respondents) that as NASA managers have turned over
critical tasks to contractors they have lost the ability to
critique contractor designs, tests and operations.
Several respondents mentioned that government employees
responsible for contract monitoring tend to develop close
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relationships with contractors and thus the government's interests
may not be maintained. Many contractor personnel, they noted, are
former NASA employees. "Cozy relationships result in the
inappropriate use of contractors," several respondents noted.
Others expressed views that tasks that involve significant value
judgments or assurance that the public interest is paramount should
not be turned over to contractors; nevertheless such tasks are
sometimes performed by contractors. A few employees who have been
with the NASA for a number of years believed that although
contractor personnel's efforts have expanded, problems do not exist
with the size of the contractor work force as much as with the
quality of their work, the incentives and the compensation.
Personnel Ceilings
Respondents stated that the principal reason for losing
technical expertise has been the imposition of arbitrary personnel
ceilings by OMB and Congress. Ceilings were imposed, many
respondents noted, because of the erroneous belief that contracting
would save money and the view that the size of the government would
be reduced. Several respondents said that contracting is often
more expensive because the private sector pays higher salaries and
provides better benefits. While most engineers and scientists
conceded that it is unrealistic and undesirable for civil servants
to perform all tasks, they believed that NASA has contracted out
the performance of many critical functions, thus losing control,
diluting responsibility and avoiding accountability. While
respondents did not believe it is feasible to precisely define a
set of functions that should be reserved for government employees,
many suggested reducing the number of contractors and increasing
the number of civil servants.
Paperwork
A large number of respondents at all centers, with the
exception of the Stennis Space Center, complained about the amount
and nature of the paper work. Employees noted that in the past
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NASA did not resemble the rest of the government with respect to
the amount of red tape, but one employee noted that it has lately
become "more process oriented and less object oriented." Center
personnel complained about the amount and irrelevance of paper work
associated with writing and awarding contracts, the amount of paper
work associated with selling programs, and the number of rules and
regulations required to manage and track resources. "Administrative
micromanagement is rampant and its links to technical management
are adverse," one employee observed. Headquarters' employees
complained far less about the amount of paper work than did field
center employees although meetings, justifications, purchase
requests and other administrative tasks were characterized as
excessive by employees from all locations.
Pay and Benefits
A number of employees at all installations compared the
salaries and benefits of civil servants and private sector
employees. In addition, 90 percent of respondents at the Ames
Research Center raised the issues of pay and benefits. Respondents
from Ames tied attrition to the pursuit of better pay and benefit
packages and noted that the core factor motivating decisions to
change jobs is pay. Although they acknowledged that NASA has been
at the mercy of pay policies formulated at higher levels of the
federal government, they pointed out that the challenging work will
not be able to offset the high costs associated with living in
California communities. Despite the compelling logic of their
position, they feel pessimistic about decreasing pay differentials
between the two sectors. A key ingredient of their pessimism is
the belief that NASA will not be able to break away from the
compensation policies and practices of the federal government as a
whole. The potential for obtaining pay differentials, according to
respondents, appears low in spite of the accumulation of evidence
that the cost of living on the West Coast is increasingly more than
in the rest of the nation. The following comments briefly state
the positions of Ames employees:
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Salary is the primary reason for the loss of some of
NASA's best scientists and engineers.
Most of the manpower problems at NASA are related to pay.
The pay at NASA is poor, both in relative and absolute
terms.
NASA pay scale, relative to industry, makes it very
difficult to recruit and retain top quality scientists
and engineers.
This questionnaire omitted what is the single most
important issue to NASA employees in high cost of living
areas such as the San Francisco Bay area: pay_
The pay and compensation problem was also an recurring concern
to employees at the Goddard Space Center who often tied profes-
sional commitment to pay. The subject of pay attracted no comments
at the Stennis Space Center and little attention at other centers.
Politicization
A number of respondents at all centers talked about increasing
politicization of NASA and the resultant advocacy of programs.
NASA, they noted, is increasingly driven by the motivations,
interests, and strategies of managers, industry representatives and
politicians who dominate decisions rather than by the interests and
demands of the scientific and engineering communities and the
public. Because NASA is subject to erratic funding and budget
constraints, it spends a great deal of time building political
constituencies and delivering services in ways that enable
politicians to reap rewards and claim credits.
Funding and budgeting problems have resulted in a "grab bag"
mentality at each of the centers, and the name of the game is to
obtain as much new work as possible. These actions made a number
of respondents oppose growth and created cleavages between those
who believed that centers should engage in a limited number of
projects and those who believed that centers should expand into a
number of new areas. The costs of inducements offered by growth in
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many areas, respondentsworried, may lead to net losses in terms of
quality.
Others stressed that growth has led to powerful center
management structures with the specific mission of selling new
initiatives. Managers within these structures may pursue
initiatives to solidify their jobs and salaries and to prepare
themselves for future employment with the private sector without
being aware of the impacts of their actions. Most prominent among
opinions was the belief that selling of programs has led to
competition among centers to enlarge their own budgets and loyalty
to particular centers rather then to NASA as a whole. One
respondent raised an important question, How long and how far can
centers stake out independent positions? Another simply stated,
"Program decisions are politically driven."
Leadership
Respondents firmly believed that competition among centers has
resulted, in part, from the lack of direction by senior managers.
Respondents from all centers highlighted two unresolved issues: the
lack of direction from Headquarters and the lack of competence and
credibility of senior managers. Several respondents noted that
senior managers are no longer perceived as knowledgeable and
expert. Some perceptions of senior managements' lack of direction
and credibility follow:
Senior managers are out of touch with the priorities,
technologies, and requirements for advanced technical
productivity.
No focused realistic plans are made and organizational
changes seem to be the norm.
There appears to be no commitment to excellence. Policy
wording is not consistent with management's actions.
NASA needs leaders with technical competence in areas
they are supposed to manage.
The biggest problem is not with working scientists and
engineers but with senior managers.
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NASA's problems can be traced to a lack of leadership
coupled with a surfeit of management.
In-House Capability and Hands-On Work
The vast majority of scientists and engineers responding to
the narrative part of this questionnaire commented on the loss of
in-house capability and the need to perform more hands-on tasks.
Many believed all scientists and engineers should have hands-on
training opportunities, saying without this employees cannot learn
how to recognize opportunities or solve problems. One engineer
noted that engineers are not as sensitive to hardware as they
should be because "they are absorbed in program status
presentations and don't get any hands-on experience beyond the
utilization of copying machines." Another engineer said, "Once
engineers become contract monitors, not doers, the appeal of their
jobs fade, unless opportunities for real direction are part of the
monitoring effort."
In the judgment of many respondents it would be beneficial if
researchers and model makers, for example, could work closely
together. The resulting mutual understanding can only be developed
through practice. According to respondents, keeping projects in-
house will (i) promote a sense of pride, (2) enhance control, (3)
develop skills, (4) ensure accountability, (5) attract capable
people, (6) contribute to the retention of employees and (7)
cultivate a creative spirit.
Several respondents pointed out the value of hands-on
experience appears to have been recognized and that several centers
have developed training assignments to engage young engineers in
the design, prototype testing, and check out of projects on a small
scale. They pleaded for the expansion of such activities.
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Larger Project vs. Smaller Projects
A limited number of employees at all centers commented on the
presence of large, unfocused programs that are poorly conceived,
inadequately funded and never completed. Employees suggested that
working on smaller projects would enhance quality and productivity
and minimize organizational interfaces. "The pursuit of grandiose
projects results in greater inefficiencies and less technical
depth" one employee pointed out. "More time is required to deal
with the restrictions and red tape that accompany such projects,"
another mentioned. Many other aspects of management practice,
organizational structure, and organizational processes, it was
noted, are affected by the breadth and complexity of large
projects.
Several employees observed that NASA does not reject new
projects. "Presumably, this behavior characterizes organizations
that are uncertain about outcomes," a scientist wrote. The process
of getting rid of projects is a difficult one, others observed.
Fewer than ten respondents noted that small projects are as
administratively burdensome as large projects.
Image of the Government and NASA
Several respondents said that NASA employees have energy,
drive and ambition but lack the opportunity to advance the
interests of the organization because NASA is a part of the
governmental sector. Respondents also noted that negative public
opinion and bureaucrat bashing are likely to persist in view of
recent difficulties stemming from the Hubble Telescope and the
Shuttle. They acknowledged that events have determined opinion
about NASA more than words. By and large, respondents were
pessimistic about enlightening the public about space exploration
and indicated that the lack of confidence in the government and
NASA itself will not easily shift.
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Challenging Work
Many respondents talked about the challenging work at NASA and
the important contributions they have made. Several respondents
noted that they are pleased with the work that marks NASA's
increasingly sophisticated leadership in space and expressed
loyalty to NASA. A few discussed the continuing need to achieve
performance that will stand public scrutiny and fulfill NASA's
responsibility.
Employees ranked the nature of the work and the opportunity to
utilize a variety of skills and talents as NASA's greatest
advantages in comparison to the private sector and other government
agencies. A number of employees emphasized excellent relationships
with co-workers as an important asset and the reputation of NASA
within the scientific community as a major advantage.
The largest number of respondents who commented on both the
existence of challenging work and the absence of challenging work
came from the Goddard Space Center. For example, one Goddard
employee wrote, "Goddard is still unique and wonderful" and another
Goddard employee wrote, "NASA needs to find challenging work or
more engineers and scientists will leave."
Survey
Several respondents complimented the Academy on the design and
content of the questionnaire, which they believed examined the most
important issues confronting NASA. A few complained about the
ambiguity of specific items and a few believed that the questions
were biased. Many respondents believed that the results of the
questionnaire would not be utilized and noted that previous
questionnaires did not result in changes. Typical responses were:
"I don't know why I have taken the time to respond to this survey.
It will never result in changes." "Questionnaires of this kind are
irrelevant to decision making." Some respondents expressed the
hope that the results of this questionnaire would be important in
evaluating information and integrating this data with other data to
make correct choices. Several people suggested that the admini-
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strator personally meet with employees to discuss the topics that
appear in this questionnaire.
Other Issues
Several commentators noted that the work ethic, generally
defined as dedication and commitment among NASA employees, has
declined. The majority of respondents who discussed this topic
compared the work ethic of the 1960s and 1970s to the work ethic of
the 1980s. A number of older employees talked about the behavior
and attitudes of U.S. youth and their concern with the attainment
of self realization through means other than work.
Some employees talked about the unreliable yardsticks used in
performance appraisals, and believed that success at NASA is linked
to a measure of achievement known as the ability to play the
political game. "Routes to the top," one employee stated, "are not
apt to hold the keys to leading, changing, innovating, developing
or even working with people. They are based on political
considerations."
At the Lewis Research Center, an number of people pointed out
that employees were hired because of their gender and ethnicity
rather than because of their merit. Some employees commented that
the government has difficulty competing for highly qualified
members of minority groups and suffers the consequences of hiring
some with lesser qualifications.
Some respondents complained about excessive amounts of work
and others complained about underutilization; often these remarks
were, admittedly, tied to unrealistic expectations.
Some respondents suggested that NASA recruit more people with
prior industry experience. A few indicated that the popular
practice of hiring fresh-outs needs to be reviewed and that
dependence on co-op recruits should be reduced. A few people also
complained aDout arrested career progress.
Several people said that more authority to hire, promote and
fire is needed to get superior results from employees.
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Some people discussed NASA's emphasis on short term goals as
a philosophy and an attitude. Strategic planning was viewed as an
exercise or process, not as an effort to make long range plans.
One respondent noted that, "Every year a new five year plan is
developed, not merely reviewed and revised on an annual cycle." A
few people linked the lack of planning to the fact that decision
making in government is forged on the political anvil. The
majority of respondents attributed the lack of planning to NASA
senior managers who, "... are unable to formulate basic missions,
purposes and objectives." As a result NASA "muddles through." A
single respondent suggested that the solution to this problem was
to eliminate NASA and start over.
Many Headquarters employees commented on low morale; but only,
a few, from other installations raised the subject.
Many respondents noted that NASA employees have become
reluctant to take risks, resulting in excessive caution, non-
decision, and a reactive rather than proactive stance. "Favorable
opportunities," a single respondent said "are often not exploited
due to a predisposition toward covering all steps." Excessive
control of risks, it was also noted, may also result in performance
failures.
Other comments dealt with the need for White House support,
the complexity of the procurement process, the benefits of
mentorships, and the feeling that operational activities have
overshadowed research and development activities. Regarding these
comments, there were few, if any, disparities in perceptions among
personnel from different centers.
CONCLUSION
Scientists and engineers represent a significant resource for
the agency. Although a number of the problems they described are
driven by forces outside of NASA's control, many are amenable to
agency influence. Insights of scientists and engineers regarding
contracting indicate that senior NASA management should pay atten-
tion to the amount of contracting, goals, incentives, contractor
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performance, and modifications that alter the relationships between
NASA and contractors. Other areas that merit further examination
are: opportunities for hands-on training; centers' roles and
missions, responsibilities and actions of senior managers; and
politicization of NASA.
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APPENDIX A
PART IV
SURVEYINSTRUMENT
I DEMOGRAPHICS
Please provide one response for each question unless otherwise
directed. In some cases, you will need to fill in the blanks; in
other cases, you will need to draw a circle around a letter
preceding the most appropriate response. Note that when the word
"other" is listed, you are asked to write a response after the
term if you select that alternative. After responding to this
questionnaire, please place in the envelope labeled National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, NAPA, Washington, D.C.,
20546.
1. Are you :
a. Male
b. Female
2. What year were you born?
3. What was your principal reason for joining NASA?
a. Salary/prospects for future earnings.
b. Chance to work on aeronautics/space projects.
c. Interest and challenge potential of the work.
d. Geographical location.
e. Had friends or family working for NASA.
f. Job security.
g. Desire to perform government service.
h. Good working facilities.
i. Good training/educational opportunities.
j. Chance for promotion and growth within the
organization.
k. Fringe benefits.
i. Chance to work with the best people in my field.
m. Other (please specify): .....
4. What is your highest educational level?
a. College graduate (B.A., B.S. or other Bachelor's
degree).
b. Some graduate school.
c. Graduate degree (M.S., M.A., LL.B.)
d. Doctor of philosophy (Ph.D.)
e. Other (please specify):
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, Which of the following categories is most related to the
field of study at your highest degree level?
a. Agriculture
b. Biological Sciences
c. Engineering
d. Mathematical Sciences
e. Education
f. Physical Sciences (including Space Science)
g. Health Sciences
h. Other (please specify):
6. What year did you attain your highest degree?
7. What center do you work for?
a. ARC
b. LaRC
c. LeRc
d. JSC
e. KSC
f. MSFC
g. GSFC
h. SSC
i. HDQS
8. What is your organization code (triple letters)?
9. What is your grade level?
i0. Immediately prior to joining NASA what were you doing?
a. Student
b. Worked in state/local government
c. Worked in private sector
d. Military
e. Worked for another federal agency
f. Unemployed for more than a year
g. Other (please specify):
ii. How long have you worked for NASA?
a. Less than one year.
b. One year, but less than two years.
c. Two years, but less than three years.
d. Three years, but less than five years.
e. Five years, but less than ten years.
f. Ten years, but less than 15 years.
g. Fifteen years or more.
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12. Did you participate in the co-op program?
a. Yes
b. No
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II NATURE OF WORK
i. From the activities listed below, select your primary and
secondary work activities for your principal job, in terms of
time devoted for a typical week. Enter the letter P for primary
work activity and S for secondary work activity.
a. Management or administration of research or
development.
b. Management or administration of activities other
than research and development.
c. Teaching, training, guiding or counseling
employees or trainees.
d. Basic research - that is, effort directed toward
gaining scientific knowledge primarily for its own
sake.
e. Applied research - that is, effort directed toward
gaining scientific or engineering knowledge in an
effort to meet a recognized need.
f. Development - product, process, and technical
development. That is, direction of knowledge
gained from research toward production of
materials, devices, systems and methods.
g. Report and technical writing, editing, information
retrieval.
h. Design of equipment, processes, models.
i. Quality control, testing, evaluation, or
inspection.
j. Operations - facility, system, mission,
installation
k. Statistical work - survey work, forecasting,
statistical analysis.
i. Computer applications.
m. Other activities (please specify):
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2. During a typical week, approximately what percent of working
time do you devote to each of the following activities? Please
indicate the amounts of time in percentages.
a°
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
%
%
k °
i. %
% Management & administration
% Design
% Basic research
% Testing/evaluation
% Applied research
% Development
% Teaching/training
% Operations
Computer applications
Paperwork: RTOP Preparation, work
statement, proposals preparation
and progress reports.
% Contractor oversight
Other
100.0% Total
3. How would you characterize the utilization of technical
competence of experienced scientists and engineers with whom you
work (at your center)?
a. Excellent utilization
b. Good utilization
c. Fair utilization
d. Poor utilization
e. Very poor utilization
4. How would you characterize the utilization of technical
competence of _oung scientists and engineers with whom you work
(at your center)?
a. Excellent utilization
b. Good utilization
c. Fair utilization
d. Poor utilization
e. Very poor utilization
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5. In your present job, please characterize the level of
technical responsibility you most often exercise.
a,
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Simple prescribed procedures
Sequence of prescribed procedures
Specific applications
Application of standard methods
Generation of alternative methods
Performance of complex tasks
Planning/organization of projects
Pioneering work
Problem solving
Systems analyses
6. Since joining NASA, has the diversity (e. g. variety and
complexity) of work increased (at your center)?
a. Yes
b. No
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III "HANDS-0N" / CONTRACTING
i. At your center, do contractors perform any of the following
duties? Please circle all items that apply:
a. Establish policy
b. Commit government resources
c. Represent NASA at meetings
d. Define work assignments
e. Review progress
f. Revise work assignments
g. Monitor performance
2. In your opinion, at your center, which of the following types
of support provided by contractors exceed what should be provided
by the private sector. Please circle all items that apply:
8
b
C
d
e
f
g
Engineering and technical services
Research and development
Data processing
Program control
Mission operations
Other
None
A number of statements dealing with various aspects of work are
listed below. In the columns on the right side please indicate
the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement by
placing a check under the appropriate response. Please check
only one of the five alternatives for each item.
3. The pe:-formance of
sciences and engineering
by NASA is less efficient
than by industry.
4. Scientists/engineers
should perform "hands-on"
work once in a while other-
wise they will lose their
proficiency
5. People with direct
plobl_m solving experience
:_et the best _esults.
STRONGLY
AGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE DISAGREE
i i
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6, It is a good idea for
NASA scientists and
engineers to specialize in
a single area.
7. A top notch technical
background is needed for
contract management.
8. NASA provides challeng-
ing work assignments.
9. Most productive
researchers do not want to
manage contractor efforts.
i0. Contract management,
within the context of
NASA. requires more tech-
nical capabilities than
administrative skills.
II. A great deal of chal-
lenging aeronautics and
space work is performed
by contractors, not NASA.
12. Systems analysis cap-
abilities and integrative
skills are highly valued
in NASA,
13, The trend toward ex-
panding use of contractors
has shifted challenging
technical tasks from NASA
to contractors.
14. There is a blurring of
distinction between contrac-
tors and civil servants on
NASA sites,
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
i
i
NEUTRAL
STRONGLY
DISAGREE DISAGREE
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15. Hands-on experience
is required to understand how
to manage and evaluate con-
tractors efforts.
16, NASA should hire more
engineers and scientists with
private sector experience.
17. The future roles of
contractors should be more
limited than what they cur-
rently are.
18. Contractors have assumed
many functions that are in-
herently governmental.
Ig. NASA program managers
spend too much of their
time exercising oversight
responsibilities.
20_ NASA has in-house com-
petence to make responsible
decisior_s in all programs
for which it is responsible.
21. NASA's in-house scienti-
fic and engineering capabili-
ties are as strong as in the
past.
22, NASA's in-house manage-
ment/administrative capabil-
ities are as strong as in the
past.
23. In general, NASA pro-
gram managers have the right
mix of both technical and
administrative skills neces-
sary to successfully complete
j obs.
STRONGLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL D_SAGREE DISAGREE
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24. A ]arge number of
scientists and engineers in
NASA are malutilized (e.g.
unreasonable time demands
on the job].
25. A large number of
scientists and engineers
in NASA are underutillzed
(e.g. light technical
demands).
26. The public interest
would be better served if
less technical work were
contracted out to the
private sector.
27. The private sector pro-
vides a climate for greater
creativity and productivity
of scientists and engineers
than the public sector.
28. NASA does a good Job of
identifying, developing and
assigning people capable of
playing key roles in the
technical direction of
projects.
29. NASA needs to expand or
initiate more in-house pro-
jects to provide for hands-
on experience.
30. Too much of scientific
and engineering efforts in
NASA is spent in preparing
and selling programs.
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
I
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31. When people leave NASA,
they rarely leave because
the work does not have enough
"hands-on" characteristics
(e.g., development and fabri-
cation of protypes, testing,
production).
32. Greater numbers of per-
sonnel working in support
of NASA scientists and
engineers (technicians,
model makers and other
s_illed workers, and
p*oduction workers) should
be civil servants.
33. Many important manage-
ment decisions are being
made by contractors,not
civil servants.
34. Within NASA, program
control functions need to
be strengthened,
35. Few fndividuals in
NASA possess skills in-
volving th,_ artful blend
ing of technology and
administration.
36. Modern tools such as
computer assisted design
do not provide scientists
and engineers with an
intuitive feel for hardware.
37. Engineers should be
able to acquire "cradle to
grave" experience on
projects.
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
t
I
I
STRONGLY
NEUTRAL DISAGREE DISAGREE
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IV IMAGE OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE
Please indicate how strongly you agree or
following statements.
I. I would recommend NASA
as an employer.
2. I am doing important
work as a NASA employee.
3. Government service is
a place to gain experience
for a better job.
4. In the government,
there is more red tape than
in non-governmental sectors.
5. Government R&D is less
efficient than the private
sector.
6. Most scientific and
engineering students would
prefer working in the pri-
vate sector.
7. Government workers are
as important in science
and engineering as any other
group of workers.
8, On the whole, government
scientists and engineers are
as capable as scientists and
engineers in other sectors.
9. The best scientists and
engineers leave the govern-
merit for other jobs.
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE
i
i
NEUTRAL DISAGREE
disagree
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
wi th the
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I0. Government workers are
as carefully selected and
recruited as private sector
workers,
ii. The government attracts
fresh-outs as capable as
fresh-outs which the private
sector attracts.
12. The good points about
working for the government
outweigh the bad points.
13, Scientists and engineers
working for the government
have good chances to get
ahead.
14. Government employees
have as much of a chance
to develop as their pri-
vate sector counterparts.
15. Considering political.
economic and social trends,
the government, as an em-
ployer, rates higher than
other sectors.
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
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V RECRUITMENT/RETENTION
i. How many years will it take before you are eligible for
retirement?
a
b
c
d
e
f
Currently eligible.
Under five years.
Five to seven years.
Eight to ten years.
Ten to 15 years.
Sixteen years or more.
2. How long do you plan to work at NASA?
a. Under five years.
b. Five to seven years.
c. Eight to ten years.
d. Ten to 15 years.
e. Sixteen years or more.
f. Undecided.
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the
following statements.
3. My progress at NASA
has been satisfactory.
4. My job fits in well
with my future goals.
5. I regard working
for NASA as my lifetime
career.
6. The quality of cur-
rent NASA hires in science
and engineering is as I
good as it has always i!
been.
I
7. I feel less satisfied !
with my work as time i
Igoes on.
STRONGLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE DISAGREE
i
i
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8. I would quit my job
if I found another job
in the same line of work
with comparable benefits.
9. I am not eager to
change my job, but I
would change it if I
could get a better job,
i0. Scientists and engineers
at NASA need to perform more
"hands-on" work.
ii. The majority of
scientists and engineers
with whom I work will
Fetire as soon as they
a;e eligible.
12. Most NASA scientists
and engineers often talk
of changing jobs.
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL DISAGREE
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
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VI CONCLUDING STATEMENT
Do you wish to comment on this questionnaire or add any observa-
tions concerning any of the topics which this questionnaire
emphasized?
Thank you for your cooperation!
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